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VOLUME I 
VOLUME 11 
Date: 3/3/2009 Sixth Ji~dicial District Court - Bannock County 
Time: 08:46 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 4 Case: CV-2007-0003303-OC Current Judge: David C Nye 
Linda Brown vs. City of ~ocatello 
User: DCANO 
Linda Brown vs. City of Pocatello 
Date Code User Judge 
8/3/2007 LOCT DCANO SUPREME COURT APPEAL; Clerk's Office David C Nye 
NCOC 
COMP 
SMlS 
ATTR 
NOTC 
ANSW 
DFJT 
NOTC 
NOTC 
NOTC 
NOTC 
NOTC 
NOTC 
HRSC 
DCANO 
DCANO 
DCANO 
DCANO 
DCANO 
DCANO 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
New Case Filed-Other Claims David C Nye 
Complaint Filed David C Nye 
Summons Issued David C Nye 
Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No David C Nye 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Lowell N. Hawkes, 
Chartered Receipt number: 0082937 Dated: 
8/3/2007 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: [NONE] 
Plaintiff: Brown. Linda Attorney Retained Lowell N David C Nye 
Hawkes 
Notice of Service of first Discovery to Defendant; David C Nye 
First Discovery to Defendant with service of 
Complaint and Jury Demand, Lowell N. Hawkes, 
Atty for Plntf. 
Answer and Demand for Jury Trial; aty Blake David C Nye 
Hall for city of pocatello; 
Demand For Jury Trial David C Nye 
Notice of service - 2nd discovery to def; aty L/ David C Nye 
Hawkes for plntf 
Notice of service - Defs first set of lnterrog and David C Nye 
req for production of documents and req for 
admission; aty Blake Hall for city of pocatello 
Notice of service - Defs Answer to plntfs req. for David C Nye 
admission; atyBlake Hall for City of Pocatello 
Notice of service - Defs Answer to Plntfs first set David C Nye 
of lnterrog and req for production of documents; 
aty Blake Hall for def 
Notice of service - plntfs resp to defs first req for David C Nye 
admission; aty LI Hawkes 
Notice of Depo - of Linda Brown on 12-13-07 at David C Nye 
9:00 am: aty Blake Hall 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference David C Nye 
02/04/2008 10:30 AM) 
2/26/2008 ATTR AMYW Defendant: City of Pocatello Attorney Retained David C Nye 
Sam Angell 
HRSC CAMILLE Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/23/2008 09:OO David C Nye 
AM) 
HRSC CAMILLE Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference David C Nye 
09/08/2008 10:OO AM) 
5/23/2008 CAMILLE Plaintiffs Fact and Expert Witness Disclosure; David C Nye 
aty Lowell Hawkes for plntf 
6/9/2008 MOTN CAMILLE Motion for summary judgment, aty Blake Hall for David C Nye 
City of Pocatello 
MEMO CAMILLE Memorandum in support of motionn for summary David C Nye judgment, aty Blake Hall for City of Pocatello 
Date: 3/3/2009 Sixth JP.-'icial District Court - Bannock County 
Time: 08:46 AM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 4 Case: CV-2007-0003303-OC Current Judge: David C Nye 
Linda Brown vs. City of Pocatello 
Linda Brown vs. City of Pocatello 
User: DCANO 
HRSC 
NOTC 
CONT 
HRSC 
MOTN 
AFFD 
AFFD 
MEMO 
RESP 
MEMO 
BRFS 
BRFS 
MEMO 
DEOP 
DSBT 
MOTN 
MEMO 
NOTC 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary David C Nye 
Judgment 07/07/0900 09:OO AM) 
Amended notice of hearing; aty Blake Hall (set David C Nye 
for 7-28-08 at 9:00 am) 
Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment David C Nye 
07/07/2008 09:OO AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary David C Nye 
Judgment 07/28/2008 09:OO AM) 
Plntfs motion for partial summary judgment and David C Nye 
notice of hearing; aty Ryan Lewis 
Affidavit of Linda Brown; aty Ryan Lewis for David C Nye 
plntf 
Affidavit of counsel; aty Ryan Lewis for plntf David C Nye 
Memorandum supporting plntfs Motion for partial David C Nye 
summary judgment, aty Ryan Lewis for plntf 
Defendants Fact and Expert Witness Disclosure; David C Nye 
aty Blake Hail for City of Pocatello 
Plntfs Resp in opposition to defs motion for David C Nye 
summary judment; aty L/ Hawkes for plntf 
Defs Memorandum in opposition to plntfs motion David C Nye 
for summary judgment; aty Blake Hall for City of 
Pocatello 
Plntfs Reply in support of Her Motion for summary David C Nye 
judgment, aty Ryan Lewis for plntf 
Defs Reply Brief; aty Blake Hall for City of David C Nye 
Pocatello 
Defs Reply Brief in support of motion for David C Nye 
summary judgment, aty Jeffrey Brunson for def 
Defs Memorandum in opposition to motion to David C Nye 
strike affidavit of Brett Harris; aty Jeffrey 
Brunson 
Decision on motions for summary judgment, David C Nye 
Court Denies plntfs motion for p artial Summary 
Judgment and Grants Defs Motion for Summary 
Judgment: J Nye 9-4-08 
Judgment of Dismissal; plntfs c omplaint is David C Nye 
dismissed with prej; with plntf taking nothing 
thereunder: J Nye 9-15-08 
Motion for reconsideration; aty L I  Hawkes for David C Nye 
plntf 
Memorandum supporting plntfs motion for David C Nye 
reconsideration ; aty LI Hawkes for plntf 
Notice of hearing; plntfs motion for David C Nye 
reconsideration; aty Ryan Lewis 
Date: 3/3/2009 Sixth Jt.4icial Bdstrict Court - Bannock County 
Time: 08:46 AM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 4 Case: CV-2007-0003303-OC Current Judge: David C Nye 
Linda Brown vs. City of~ocatello 
Linda Brown vs. City of Pocatello 
User: DCANO 
10/14/2008 OBJT CAMILLE 
MEMO CAMILLE 
11/7/2008 DPWO CAMILLE 
CSTS CAMILLE 
1211 912008 MEGAN 
APSC DCANO 
NOTC DCANO 
MlSC DCANO 
12/26/2008 MlSC DCANO 
DCANO 
1/7/2009 MlSC DCANO 
MlSC DCANO 
1/8/2009 MlSC DCANO 
1/28/2009 MlSC DCANO 
Defendants Objection to Plntfs Motion for David C Nye 
Reconsideration; aty Blake Hall for City of 
Pocatello 
Defs Memorandum in Opposition to Plntfs Motion David C Nye 
for Reconsideration; aty Blake Hall for City of 
Pocatello 
Decision on Motion for Reconsideration; (Court David C Nye 
DENIES plntfs Motion for Reconsideration, Crts 
Original Decision Regarding immunity. J Nye 
1 1-7-08 
Case Status Changed: closed David C Nye 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court David C Nye 
($86.00 for the Supreme Court to be receipted via 
Misc. Payments. The $15.00 County District 
Court fee to be inserted here.) Paid by: Jerimy 
Johnson Receipt number: 00471 37 Dated: 
12/19/2008 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: Brown, 
Linda (plaintiff) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court David C Nye 
NOTICE OF APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT; David C Nye 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Atty for Plntf. 
Received payment of $86.00 for Supreme Court David C Nye 
check#161 and $100.00 for Clerk's Record 
check #I60 on 12-19-08. (Check #I59 for 
$100.00 to Stephanie Morse sent to Stephanie on 
12-26-08) 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL received in David C Nye 
Court Records on 12-26-08. Mailed to SC and 
Counsel on 12-26-08. 
Miscellaneous Payment: Supreme Court Appeal David C Nye 
Fee (Please insert case #) Paid by: Kristi L. 
Johnson/Lowell Hawkes Receipt number: 
0047705 Dated: 12/26/2008 Amount: $86.00 
(Check) 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT: Notice of Appeal David C Nye 
received in SC on 12-29-08. Docket # 
35992-2009. Clerk's Record and Reporter's 
Transcript due 3-6-09 (2-2-09 5 weeks prior) 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Certificated David C Nye 
of Appeal received in SC on 12-29-08. 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT: Clerk's Record and David C Nye 
Transcript Due Date Reset to 4-10-09. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT RECEIVED IN David C Nye 
COURT RECORDS ON 1-28-09 for Motion for 
Summary Judgment held 7-28-08 and Motion for 
Reconsideration held 10-20-08 
Date: 3/3/2009 Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County 
Time: 08:46 AM ROA Report 
Page 4 of 4 Case: CV-2007-0003303-OC Current Judge: David C Nye 
Linda Brown vs. City of Pocatello 
User: DCANO 
Linda Brown vs. City of Pocatello 
Date Code User Judge 
3/3/2009 MlSC DCANO Clerk's Record received in Court Records on David C Nye 
3-3-09. 
Lowell N. Hawkcs (ISB #1852) 
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775) 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 23514200 
Attorneys for Plaintzr 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable David C. Nye 
LINDA B R O W ,  1 
1 Case No. CV-2007-3303-OC 
Plaint& 1 
1 
VS. ) 
1 AFFlDAVlT OF 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a Municipal 1 LINDA BROWN 
Corporation; ) 
1 
Defendant. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
: SS 
BANNOCK COUNTY ) 
LINDA BROWN, being first duly sworn states as follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff herein and make this affidavit on personal knowledge 
and in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. I have lived at 2300 Darrell Loop, Pocatello, Idaho, since April 15, 
2001. Linda Brown Deposition 4:25-5:7. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 1 
Brown v. City ofPocatello 
3. My back yard is adjacent to Pocatello Creek Road and is approximately 
half way between, the KOA Campgrounds "uphill" south of my home and ... 
the Boy Scouts of America offices "downhill" north of my home. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 2 
Brown v. Cily of Pocatello 
4. Between June 2005 through August 2005 work on the Pocatello Creek 
Road was done which ended directly behind my home. Lknda Brown Deposktlon 6221- 
6s9. The Defendant City of Pocatello negligently altered and reconstructed the 
Pocatello Creek Road roadway fkom its prior "water-safe" condition so as to create, 
among other things, a new roadway depression and water run-off pattern that had not 
previously existed was created and that did not damage adjacent private properties. 
5. Prior to this 2005 road worWconstruction, neither my home nor yard had 
been flooded from roadway run-off water. Linda Brown Deposition $2:12-19; 64:20- 
6%6. My backyard had never been flooded: 
6. Following the 2005 Pocatello Creek Road worWconstruction, my yard 
and home has been subjected to numerous, frequent and inevitable occasions of flooding 
by water coming off of Pocatello Creek Road and into my yard and home. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 3 
Brown v. City ofPocatello 
7. Ultimately - but only after I was required tofile this lawsuit - did the 
City add an asphalt-to-cement barrier to keep roadway water on the road shoulders and 
stop the flooding from runoff into my yard and home. 
8. It is unknown how long this make-do temporay "fix" will last before 
eroding or wearing away (like prior-attempted fixes) with the flooding repeated. 
9. Water Does Not Reach the Curb and Gutter. The project has a 
partial curb and gutter, but "The water will not run to that curb and gutter" it pools or 
stalls before it gets there: 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 4 
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
10. Drain is on the opposite side of the Road. The roadway as 
reconstructed in the summer of 2005 allowed roadway water to pool on and adjacent to 
the roadway as there was no adequate design or means to properly and safely divert water 
without it passing onto my property; a gutter drain has been installed on the east-uphill 
side of the road but not on the west-downhill side of the road adjacent to my home where 
it is needed. Linda Brown Deposition 108:25-109:7. 
11. Flood: Februaw 28.2006. My home initially flooded February 28, 
2006. I came home from work at the PMC to find my "basement was entirely covered in 
water" from "three inches deep" to "a half inch deep." Linda Brown Deposition 8:11-24. 
I went in the back yard and saw that the "landscaping in the backyard had been eroded 
away and there was a lot of silt and dirt" washed from the upper garden are onto the 
lawn, and "the water had come across the lawn and into the house." Linda Brown 
Deposition 10:9-15. It was evident that the "flooding on that February 28, 2006, flood" 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 5 
Brown v. City ofPocafello 
was caused by "the water" and "had come off from Pocatello Creek Road" based upon 
"the way that the backyard was eroded." Linda Brown Depositton 12:12-16. There was 
a debris-water line on the window which showed where the water level had been inside 
the window well and where "the water had come in through the back yard into the 
house." Linda Brown Deposition 9E12-16. 
12. Basement Damaeed: This February 28,2006 flood caused "water 
damage" in the "whole basement." Linda Brown Deposition 45:21-46:8. The "water on 
the sheetrock" also evidenced the area and depth of flooding. Linda Brown Deposition 
9El2-14. 
13. The roadway water flowed off Pocatello Creek Road and under my 
back yard fence as evidenced by the hole in this photo, 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 6 
Brown v. Cily ofPocatello 
rn 
carrying debris and soil and rock with it into my yard and across my yard and... 
With water pouring under the fence as seen in this photo, 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 7 
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
into my home through windows and... 
into and down my walls and... 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 8 
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
onto floors and under carpeting ... 
and into other rooms and under tile. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 9 
Brown v. City ofPocatello 
14. Never Flooded Before. This flooding had never happened before 
(Linda Brown Deposition 12:17-19) in the nearly five years I had lived in my home - 
since April 15,2001. Linda Brown Deposition 4:25-5:7. 
15. Clean-up* I contacted Service Master and "They sent a team in with 
high-powered vacuums to suck up the water. All of the furniture, everything that was in 
the basement was moved up to the family room. 
All the carpets were pulled, the padding was destroyed, and the carpets were re-laid back 
down on the floor to dry to see if they could be salvaged. They brought in big fans and 
heating units to dry out the entire basement." Linda Brown Deposition 11:s-13. I had 
other contractors come in to respond to the damage. The "carpet was not salvageable in 
the bedroom so it was replaced by Rug Rat Floor Covering." Linda Brown Deposition 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 10 
Brown v. City ofPocatello 
i1:16-21. I also "did a lot of repairs with the help of '  my son at that time, including 
sheet rock replacement, "taking up the carpet" and some of the baseboards and some of 
the trim around the window." Linda Brown Deposition 12:l-6. My friend, Rod Silcock, 
"came in and helped with some of the trim work and some of the Perfa-taping and other 
items that needed to be repaired." Linda Brown Deposition 126-9. 
16. Subsequent Frequent and Inevitable Flooding. Since that first 
flood, I have experienced the fi-equent and inevitable flooding as set forth herein. 
17. Flood: April 16.2006. On April 16,2006, I was at home during a 
storm when water off Pocatello Creek Road again began flooding her backyard and "was 
able to observe where the water was coming from, which was off from Pocatello Creek 
Road." Linda Brown Deposition 1220-13:l. I "dug a trench" in my "lawn to divert the 
water away from" the "house" and was able to divert the water to protect against further 
damage. Linda Brown Deposition 13:18. That trench is seen in this photo: 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page I 1  
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
18. Plaintiff Contacted the City. After this flood, I contacted the City of 
Pocatello offices and was referred to "Cac Turner" and I told him that I "had been 
experiencing flooding from Pocatello Creek Road and that it was entering my yard and 
also my home." Linda Brown Deposition 13:lS-14:14. 
19. Drainage Problem Admitted. Mr. Turner "said that he would go up 
and take a look at it" and contacted me and admitted "I can see that there is a problem 
and he sent a crew up and they put a small amount of gravel up on the road where it had 
initially come through the barrier." Linda Brown Deposltion 14:5-14. 
20. City on Notice. I filed a "Claim for Damages or Injury" dated April 
25,2006 with the City of Pocatello, and reported the "Flooding to basement & backyard" 
and included photos and described the flooding since the Pocatello Creek Road work 
alterations. A copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A (See also Affldavit of 
Lindell Turner, Exhibit E, evidencing receipt by Defendant). 
21. Flood: October 4.2006. On October 4,2006, during a rainstorm, I 
was at home and "went upon the road and took photos and I "could see exactly why the 
water was entering my property" because the "new portion of the road was built too high 
and would not allow the proper drainage of water coming down Pocatello Creek Road 
into the city. It stopped [pooled] right at my home." Linda Brown Deposition 15:18- 
16:l. While this caused additional "erosion" to my "landscaping," fortunately, my 
diversion ditch that I had dug in my yard kept the flood water from reaching my home. 
Linda Brown Deposition 16:5-12. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 12 
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
22. Flood: December 24,2006. On December 27,2006, there was 
another "rainstorm" and "The water flowed down Pocatello Creek Road into" my 'yard, 
across the lawn" but the trenches were "filled in with dirt, silt, water, ice, and the water 
again came into the house." Linda Brown Deposition 16:24-17:4. 1 again suffered 
damage to my home and again reported this to the City. Linda Brown Deposition 17:5-9. 
23. Citv Meets With Linda Brown's Son. My son, Shawn Brown, met 
with City personnel at my home on February 2,2007. Linda Brown Deposition 17:lO- 
14; 20:21-23. Mr. Turner agreed "that there was a problem with the road" and I was 
"asked to resubmit a new list of expenses at that time and resubmit the claim that had 
been previously denied" which I did. Linda Brown Deposition 17:20.18:1. 
24. Additional Damages to the Home. My "second round" of damages 
was "to the walls, specifically this time you could see the rust marks from the water near 
the mop boards. The carpet was again damaged. The tile in the bathroom had been 
damaged at this point in time." Soon after I "began to see mold growing" around the 
window." Linda Brown Deposition 1&2-11. 
25. Gravel Pi Failed. The City's prior so-called gravel fix was 
inadequate; I continued to see water running down my "landscaping towards" my house 
"every time it rained." Linda Brown Deposition 2311-13. 
26. Sandbags Are Not a Solution. The City attempted to stop the 
flooding by placing sandbags as a temporary remedy. See Answer to Retiuest for 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 13 
Brown v. City ofPocatello 
Admission Nos. 6 and 9 (See Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit B, p. 3); Interrogatory No. 7 
(See Affidavit off Counsel, Exhibit C, p. 4, 9). 
27. Sandbay Onlv Spread the Water on more of mv property. I took 
pictures of the sandbags which attempted to fix the problem, but just slowed the flow of 
the water and did not prevent the water from entering my property. Linda Brown 
Deposition 24:25-25:8. 
28. Rather than contain the water, the sandbags acbally "spread the water 
out so" it dispersed throughout my yard." Linda Brown Deposition 25:s-12. 
The second picture shows the collection of silt and rocks on the sandbags evidencing the 
pooling of water. 
29. Au~ust 27.2007 - Asphalt barrier orevents Floodin?. After filing 
the Complaint and serving discovery, the City put "asphalt up against the [concrete] 
barrier along Pocatello Creek Road," I have not had "flooding since then," or "water 
getting into" my "landscaping," or "basement." Linda Brown Deposition 24:2-11. Based 
upon Defendant's own records, this occurred August 20,2007. See Answer to 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 44 
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
Interrogatory No. 9 (See Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit B, p. 4, 40). Two weeks after 
service of the Complaint and First Discovery. Affidavit of Counsel, n3. 
30. It took my filing of this lawsuit to get the City to take proper action to 
contain its roadway run-off water. 
3 1 .  Permanent Fix??? It is unknown if the asphalt placement is a 
"permanent" fix. I continue to worry about flooding on my property and the City's 
indifference to the problem it created. 
32. Dama~es. I have experienced significant damages and expenses to 
repair and remediate the City's improper draining of run-off water onto my property. 
Among other repair and damages, I have had to repair and replace wall trim, window 
him, sheetrock, taping, texturing, painting, insulation, floor molding, window molding, 
carpet, and tile. 
33. Clean-up Expense. Initially, I hired Service Master Cleaning and 
Restoration and their bill was $2,940.10 and has incurred at least an additional $283.70 
in finances charges. Linda Brown Deposition 53:20-24; See Exhibit B attached hereto. 
34. Flooring Dama~es. I have incurred damages for expense to Rug Rat 
Floor Covering to repair carpet in the amounts of $548.44 and $1,830.19. See Exhibit C, 
pp. 4-2 attached hereto. I have also incurred expense in the to-date amount of 
$1,066.68 to repair damaged tile - ajob not yet completed. Linda Brown Deposition 
55:23-24; See Exhibit C, p. 3 attached hereto. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 15 
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35. Basement Damape. I have incurred additional repair expenses for 
sheetrock, taping and texturing, insulation, painting, him, and expenses for work done by 
Shawn Brown, in the amount of $l,Yi)3.13, plus $172.84. See Exhibit D attached 
hereto; Linda Brown Deposition 27:4-5; 28:4-6. 1 have also incurred $224.08 in 
additional paint and supplies and items damaged from waters and moving. See Exhibit 
A, pp. 5,941 attached hereto. 
36. Mold Abatement. I hired "John McCasland, Best Clean Care" a 
specialist in "mold abatement" who "determined that there was mold in the house, then 
came back and took care of the mold abatement." Linda Brown Deposition 42:4-9; The 
bills for Best Clean Care are $250 and $6,633.25 (See Exhibit E attached hereto), 
which is less than the initial estimate of $250 plus $13,590.44." Linda 6mwn Deposition 
50:20-23. 
37. Mold 1 was required to hire mold remediation 
experts including Bradley Harr and Mike Larango who prepared a pre- and post- 
remediation mold report which cost $3,322.58. See Exhibit F attached hereto. 
38. Window, incurred $654.04 in damages to replace the 
bedroom window which had molded after the flooding. See Exhibit 6 attached hereto. 
39. Remaining Landsca~iny Damape. The damage to my yard has not 
been repaired, but I received a bid in the amount of $5,457.00 from "Edged in Stone" to 
make the landscaping repairs necessary to repair the damage. See Exhibit H attached 
hereto. The initial landscaping damage is significantly higher than originally because of 
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the City's failure to repair the improper water discharge after my first notice and 
continued damage. 
40. I have further been damaged by damage to the value of my home 
caused by the flooding and mold, and loss of use of the lower portion of my home for the 
three months of February into May 2006, and eleven months from December 2006 
through November 2007. 
DATED this 30" day of June, 2008. 
LINDA BROWN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30" day of June, 2008. 
My Commission E 
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N USE ONLY I 
DAl L (IECEIVED: 
RECEIVED BY: 
CLAIM FOR DAMAGE OR INJURY 
(NOTE: It is a requirement that this form, if used, be presented to and filed with RHONDAL. JOHNSON, CITY CLERK,911 N. 
7TH, PO BOX 4169, POCATELLO ID 83205-4169. This form is being orovided as a wurtesv to assist vou in filin~yourclaim. 
Providing this form to you is not an admission nor shall it be construed-tb be an admission of iabilityor a; acknowledgement of 
the validity of a claim by the City of Pocatello. Legal requirements for filing claims can be found in Title 6, Chapter 9, Idaho 
Code. All claims must be filed in writing within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or 
reasonably should have been discovered!) 
k m e :  L~nda ~ U W Y \  Phone Number: ( ~ c m e ) $ 3 ~ ' 5 @ @ 0  2;3Li-/3to 
current Pddress: h r d (  Loq &u#& , IL-kL.0 f3&/ 
Address for the Six Months Immediately Prior to the Date the Damage or Injury 
Occurred: &c 
Date Damage or lnjury Occurred: "/a& /&oh Time: 11" A.M. o r i  1 
Location of Occurrence: 89500 ~ Y L I [  b o p  
Any Property Damage? If so, what type? F/ood,w 40 baS nnrd I$ w& 
J 
Any Injuries? ,flo u If so, what type? 
Describe How Damage or lnjury Occurred: Smce $-ICe rcb&v,oq o-C? I 
I hereby certify that I have read the above'information and it is true and correct to the best 
of my knowledge. 
I hereby make a claim against the City of Pocatello a public entity, for 
me 
- (damage or injury) in the amount of (if known) dk 
DATE: 'b5/0 6 SIGNATURE: u b  -% 
)&~.I/o Cree t 
gjd ifi &z 
&-&$.b~c.e 

Witnesses to Damage 
Cac 2 
Engineer for City of Pocatello 
Street Department 
234-6212 
\: 
Se~iceMaster Cleaning and Restoration Team: 
Calvin Boswell 
Josh Stump 
Randy Coburn 
P.O. Box 1731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 
589-7903 
Rod Silcock 
Marilyn Silcock 
P.O. Box 58 
Inkom, Idaho 
775-3398 
James K. Lystrup 
7875 N. Prospector Hollow 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
232-6385 
Terese Parmanand 
2316 Darrell Loop 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
233-8003 
Troy J. Brown 
5447 Falconrest 
Boise, Idaho 
208-577-8956 
Shawn and Brittany Brown 
2727 S. 625 W. #A303 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
703-855-5220 
801-415-6044 
LeRoy and Lorna Wilcox 
5555 S. 5700 W. 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
356-6680 
List of Expenditures for restoring home and yard: 
ServiceMaster Cleaning and Restoration Company 
(see attached invoice) 
Rug Rag Flooring, Inc (for new carpet in Bedroom-- 
Original carpet too damaged for relaying-invoice attached) 
Armstrong Sprinklers and Landscaping (for repair 
of rock retaining wall-bid only-work can not be 
done until drier weather) 
Receipts for paint, and supplies for repairing walls 
Items damaged from water or moving (lamp broken 
while moving, file cabinet doors sprung, other sinall items 
My labor for sheetrock repair, texming, replacing trim on 
windows and mopboards, and painting. 
Total 
. . 
', ~ e r v i c e ~ i s t e r - ~ ~ & n i n ~  ~i ~ btorition , INVOICE 
i, .. 
...;. :' i , . , I  . . .. PO Box 1731 
%<ah0 fifills, IPP 83403 
208-524-8262 1208-233-2048 
E-Mail: sm8262@cableone.net 4/6/2006 204795 
BILLING ADDRESS: 
Linda Brown 
2300 Darrel Loop 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
SERVICE ADDRESS: 
. 
,* 
Rug Rat Flooring, Inc. Invoice 
212 E. Chubbuck Rd. 
Chubbuck, I D  83202 
Phone 208-237-1536 
Fax 208-237-1621 
BILL TO 
Linda Brown 
2300 Darrell Loop 
Pocatello, I D  83202 
235-5225 
DATE 
4/10/2006 
DESCRIPTION 
INVOICE # 
5160 
12~16.25 MH 8441 Jazzfest 516 Votive 
1/2" Visco Bond Pad W/:Spillguard . . .  
Custom Carpet:Instollation . . . . .  . .  .:I.,. 
. . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . .  Service'. Handling . ,. . , ' : .%. ,  
. . . . .  . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . .  : 
. . 
............................................................ -. ......... 
I DUEDATE I TERMS 
PROJECT 
SRW Bedroom Carpet 
RATE AMOUNT 
1.86 1 362.70 
1. A l l  sales are final. 
2: No refunds 9ive.n for  custom ordered merchandise. 1 
. .  3; Rug Rat Flooring is.not responsiblefor measurements made by others. 
4.-We cannot guorantee'merchandise arrival times due to conditions out of our 
control. 
5.1- 1/2% interest per month will be charged on all unpaid blanoces over 30 
days old. 
231 
Total . . $548.44 
, ,. 
~a~rnen?s/ki%dits ~.. > .:: j $O.,W 
...... 
Balance bbe. $548.44 
ARMSTRONG 
232~8416 
Sprinkler System Bid Sheet 
All sprinkler systems are Nly automatic and are self draining. This means you will not 
have to winterize @low-out) your lines in the fall. We are so confident in the self draining system 
that we'%-apnty the system against freezing for life. ( As long aS,,theewater is turned off 
completely at&. appropriate time.) The material used thro@dthe entire system is 
commercial All pipe in the system wil b9.sc&duie 40 PVC, with all sprinkler 
heads on a flexible funn'jip@ riser. The back-flom5&e and electronic valves will be in green 
valve boxes at finished grade r l  so youFan/mo~ over them. All heads are at finished grade 
TOR0 brands and come with a three year 
rs written bid. usiw the 
.... 
Auuroximate number of  watering stations: Total Price: 
Thank you, 
References: 
Sharon Manning (233-9425) Louis Bringhurst, (234-1065) Brett Jensen (251-0016) 
830 Spyglass Point 58 1 1 Moonlight Mine Rd 730 Redman 
Pocatello Pocatello Chubbuck 
TedRobyn Bell (237-7368) Kevin Booth (237-5896) Leonard Jensen (237-1 767) 
4462 Wasatch Booth Constrution 609 Gary 
Chubbuck 4745 Declaration, Chubbuck Pocatello 
Gary Reinke (238-0578) KeniDebbi Newhouse(234-4552) Keith Rasmussen (238-7264) 
3000 Richard 9536 W. Katie Mt. Drive 1396 Satterfield 
777 
800 ~ellowstoge Rve 
Poeatello ID 83201 
208-239-4000 
Your Cashier Was SUNNY 
UPC/SKII/PLU I-TEM 
41 22602582 HD $ 0 1 ~ ~  
REWARDS CARD " 44 6% 
TAX 0.85 
*rrr BALA~CE . . 17.84 
CHECK 17.84 
CHANGE 0.00 
TOTAL NUMBER OF ITEMS SOLD - I 
03/21/06 04:,12cF 260 7 135 1181001 
rrrrrlrrwanrirr~ina*iix~~t~x~~*~1(~i,s~1(* 
March Fuel Rewards 
3/1/06 - 3/31/06 
Use ?our rewards ca6.d and Fcr 
' every $100 YOU spend in the store 
durins Maryh, you'll receive a 
10 cent per gallon discounl o!i 
fuel at any FM fuel ce~!let-. 
See i n  associ& fordetai Is :. 
March Fuel rewards ereire oo 
4/30/06 . 
Qua1 ifyins purchases today :116 
Total March fuel rewards:$46 
Renalnins Feb fuel rewards:$O 
Balance nust exceed FlOO to 'he 
eligible for Fuel rewards. 
Linit 25 sallons per visit. 
**********II*~**IX*****Y&******~X***(~* 
6 * * Y I * * * X I X * X * * * * * X X X X X ~ f f X 4 f f * % X X Z * X X X  
You i u s t  earned 3 reward points! 
800 Yellowstone Rve 
Pocatello ID 83201 
208-239-4000 
Your Cashier Was JACKIE 
UPC/SKU/PLU ITEM PRICE 
41 22682432 BASKET 4.79 
10% Store Discount 0.48 
4122602583 HD PAINT 
10% Store Discount 
G; 
CI 
TAX 0.98 
war* BALANCE 20.58 
CHECK 20.58 
CHRNGE 0.00 
TOTAL NUMBER OF ITEMS SOLD * 2 
03/17/06 05:14PM 260 12 305 770266 
You could have earned 3 POINTS 
with your Fred Herer rewards card! 
Ask any essocia,te how to earn a reba 
SAVE THIS RECEIPT FOR REFUNDS 

ALWAYS LOW PRICES. 
J*' 
# ITEMS SOLD I 
YE SELL FOR LESS 
HRNRGER GRRY BLRCK 
( 208 ) 237 - 5090 
ST8 1995 ~ P P  00009047 TEII 47 TRU 03093 
TRIU TRAY 072719313572 0.96 X 
LINDOR ULK C 003746601931 F 
GV GUUHY BEA 007874246169 F 
TAPE 007535305602 1.77 X 
3PK RLR COVR' 007843590142 2.97 X 
FORM BRUSH 007004251 008 1.00 X 
TReY LINER 007004250262 0.48 X 
iY LINER 007004250262 0.48 X 
$1 COHPD 005286515100 2.07 X, 
SUBTOTRL 12.21 
TAX 1 5.000 X 0.61 
TDTRL 12.82 
HCRRD TEND 12.82 
ACCOUNT 85025 
APPROVfiL 132761 1 
TRRNS I D  - 
" IDRTION - 
/9 (0.3Y 
,YEN1 SERVICE - A 
CHANGE DUE 0.00 
# ITEMS SOLD 9 
Apply COP B Ual-Hart Discover.! 
C a l l  877-969-3668 / V l s l  t Yalmart . m m  


. , . .  . 
. . .  . 
P0,Box 1731 
.. . ldiho Falls. ID 83403 . 
. . 
.. : , .  , . PH: 208-524-8262 
, ..., . . .  ..,. 
.. . - ' FAX:2Q8;524-2610 
E-mail: sm8262@cableone.net 
Linda Brown 
2300 Darrel Loop 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
I Terms I Amount of Payment . I 
I Due on receiot I 
4574 -Job -- 
INV #204795. Due 04/06/2006. 
CREDhEM #204858. 
PMT #2699. Pmt: ROA 
PMT #2720. JUNE PYMNT 
INV #FC 2516. Due 06/01/2006. Finance Charge 
PMT #2740. JULY PMNT 
IPJV #FC 2567. Due 07/05/2006. Finance Charge 
PMT #2763. AUG. PYMNT 
INV #FC 2638. Due 08/01/2006. Finance Charge 
PMT #2777. SEPT. PMNT 
INV #FC 2674. Due 09/05/2006. Finance Charge 
PMT #2792. OCT. PMNT 
INV #FC 2754. Due 10/11/2006. Finance Charge 
PMT #28 18. NOV, PMNT 
INV #FC 2804. Due 11/01/2006. Finance Charge 
PMT #2832. DEC. PMNT 
INV #FC 2850. Due 12/01/2006. Finance Charge 
DATE 
0313 112006 
AMOUNT 
0.00 
DESCRIPTION 
Balance forwaid 
Thank you for your business. We now accept VISA / Mastercard / 
American Express for your convenience! 
- 977 
- 
12/29/2006 1 PMT #286 1. JAN 07 PMNT -1 00.00 
Amount Due 
$1,680.1 1 
Current 
24.82 
31-60 Days 
25.94 
0-30 Days 
0.00 
61-90 Days 
27.03 
Over 90 Days 
1,602.32 
STATEMENT , . 
. ). 
Linda Brown 
2300 Darrel Loop 
Pocatello, DD 83201 
POBox1731 . 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403 
PH: 208-524-8262 
FAX: 208-524-2610 ' ' 
E-mail: sm8262@cableone.net 
Statement Date E3 
Terms Amount of Payment 
Due on receipt 
DATE 
01/04/2007 
01/31/2007 
02/06/2007 
DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 
INV #FC 2889. Due 01/04/2007. Finance Charge 25.94 
PMT #2880. FEB 07 PMNT -100.00 
INV #FC 2933. Due 02/06/2007. Fiance Charge 24.82 
f i P & ~ & f  
A rb3  
Over 90 Days Amount Due 
1,602.32 $1,680.11 
Thank you for your business. We now accept VISA 1 Mastercard 1 
American Express for your conveniencei 
- 778 
61-90 Days 
27.03 
Current 
24.82 
0-30 Days 
0.00 
31-60 Days 
25.94 
, ,, $@~~~$C@MA$TE$. STATEMENT 
BILL TO 1 
Linda Brown 
2300 Darrel Loop 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
PO Box 1731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403 
PH: 208-524-8262 
FAX: 208-524-2610 
E-mail: sm8262@cableone.net 
Statement Date C Z I l  
I Terms I Amount of Fayment 
Due on receipt 
DATE 
01/31/2008 
02/05/2008 
02/13/2008 
03/06/2008 
DESCRIPTION 
Balance forward 
AMOUNT 
779.57 
4574 - Job -- 
INV #FC 3434. Due 02/05/2008. Finance Charge 
PMT #3 161. Feb 08 P m t  
INV #FC 3487. Due 03/06/2008. Finance Charge 
11.70 
-100.00 
10.37 
Amount Due 
$701.64 
Current 
10.37 
Thank you for your business. We now accept VISA / Mastercard / 
American Express for your convenience! 
7'30 
Over 9 0  Days 
666.57 
0-30 Days 
11.70 
31-60 Days 
0.00 
61-90 Days 
13.00 

. . 
, . 
. . . . .  , .  . 
, . .  . . . . . . . . .  
, , . :  
. . 
. , ,. , 
. . . . . . .  . . 
. >  .: 
. . at Flwring . Inc  ,....> . .  
. . 
. , 
: Invoice 
. . 1 .. 
, . 
212 E. Chubbuck Rd. 
Chubbuck, I D  83202 
Phone 208-237-1536 
Fax 208-237-1621 
BILL TO 
Linda Brown 
2300 Darrell Lwp 
Pocatello, I D  83202 
235-5225 
DATE 
4/10/2006 
INVOICE # 
5160 
. . .  
DUE DATE 
4/10/2006.' 
REP 
TERMS 
.. Due.onrecei'pt 
PROJECT 
SRW 
. . .  
Bedroom Carpet 
AMOUNT 
362.70 
. - . . .  76.05 . '  
. 
, , , 
8735 
21.94 
. .................... 
:,:;..7<. ...r. 
. ., . 
DESCRIPTION 
12x1625 MH 8441 Jazzfest dl6 Votive 
1/2" Visco Bond Pad W/Spillguard , . : 
Custom Carpet:In.stallation - ::. . :.-. :: :.. :.;i::.; 
. Seyvice.8 Handling! ..: :.. :: ... .:<,.;,:., .:;:,- I _  ,:.;, .. ? :  
........... , ,. . . . . . . . .  
,. .......... ..L ... :. .  .. 
. . .  . . 
- -- -. - - -. ..... .......... ...................................... ..... ..... ... ........ 
Qw 
195 
. . .  
. . . .  195 
. i .... 195 
1 
- - .......... ... 
RATE 
: 1.86 
. . . . . . . . . .  9 .
.... :;,:. . . . .   I ....;0-45...-. 
: 
21.94 
................... - . . . . . .  
. , ,, ., . . 
... .< + 
., 
ug Rat Flooring, Inc. 
12 E. Chubbuck Rd.: 
hubbuck, ID 83202 
37-1536 
OLD TO 
....... ............. 
trown Linda 
:300 Darrell Loop 
'ocatello Idaho 83201 
!36-5225 
. . , ... -- 
- .. , ..... .. , . -.... 
ll ATERIALS 
. , ........ ... . 
1) Jazz Festival-12.00 Votiie 
Comments: 12x35 
2) Pad: 1IZ"Vism Bond Pad With.Spillguard 
Proposal #: 002380 
Sale Date: 0210612007 
lristail Date: 
Sales Rep: Slier, Gary . . 
's~res Rep: 
SHIPPED TO 
- .. -. 
~inds 
Pocalello Idaho 83201 
.. ...... 
QUANTITY PRICE 
... 
420.0'0~q%t $2.59 
420.00 SqFt $0.85 $357.00 
Subtotar: $4444.80 
...... 
-.-. . . . .  -- .. . . 
ABOR 
- .- ..... -- ......... ....... - ... - 
aumm P R I C ~ ~  
.$d,45..' .- 
I )  C-Regular Carpet 420.00 SqFt $189.00 
3) EPull Old Reg. Carpet " " 420,OO SqFt $0.15 $63.00 
:4) CHaul Old Away " ** 420.00 SqFt $0.15 $63.00 
Subtotal: $315.00 
Subtotal: $I 759.80 
Misc: $70.39 
. . 
Total: $1 830.19 
. . . . . . .  Paymen& . . 
. Balance: $1830.19 
r A "  
:ug Rat Flooring, tnc. 
12 E. Chubbuck Rd. , . 
:hubbuck, ID ,83202 
37-1536 ''. 
Proposal #: 001379 
Sale Date: 02/0612007 
Install Date: , . , . . 
Sales Rep: Siler; Gary .' . , Sales Rep: . .  ::.,.: . . . . .  
. . 
;OLD TO 
- -. ......... . -- 
SHIPPED TO 
..... - . 
Gown Linda Linda 
!300 Darrell Lwp 
~ocatello, ID 83201 ID 83201 
!35-5225 
-- . . -.. ....... - - -- . - .- . .... - 
-- - .. .. - - . - - ... 
GATERIALS QUANTITY PRICE TOTA 
....... . . . .  - . - -- . . 
...... - 1 j djai'~es1gner Colors 8x8 55.00 SqFt $3.79 $208.45 
Comments; Bathroom 
2) P36891 Cove Tile 32.00 Each $439 $140.48 
3) Customs: Thinset Versabond Gray- 50# 1.00 Each $19.98 $1 9.98 
4) Hydroment Sanded Grout 25# TED 1.00 Each $16.99 $16.99 
subtotal: $385.90 
....... ..... . .....- 
A B O R  QUANTITY PRICE TOTA 
. . .. - ....... . 1') T-ceramic Labor 55.00 SqFt $5.00 $275.00 
12) U-Cove Base Labor 19.00 LbFt $4.00 $76.00 
15) T- Pull CeramicTile *Tear Out Existing ** 55.00 SqFt ' $3.25 $178.75 
16) V-R&R Stool " " 1.00 Each $110.00 $110.00 
Subtotal: $639.75 
Comments: Subtotal: $3025.65 
Misc: $41.03 
Total: $1 066.68 
Payments: 
Balancer $1066.68 

Shawn Brown 
1284 W. 2050 5. 
Woods Cross, UT 84087 
801-381-9089 
sbrownmbig-d.com 
INVOICE NO. 1 
DATE December 3,2008 
CUSTOMER ID Linda Brown 
TO Linda Brown 
2300 Darrell Loop 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
208-235-5225 
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION UNIT PRICE LINE TOTAL 
112 SF Hang and finish drywall $ 3.24 1 $ 362.88 
77A TF Texture Wall 2.02 I s 452.48 
SUBTOTAL $ 1,903.13 
SALES TAX 
1,903.13 
Make all checks payable to [Your Company Name] 
Shawn Brown 
1284 W. 2050 5. 
Woods Cross, UT 84087 
801-381-9089 
sbrown@big-d.com 
INVOICE NO. 1 
DATE December 3, 2008 
CUSTOMER ID Linda Brown 
TO Linda Brown 
2300 Darrell Loop 
Pocatelio, ID 83201 
208-235-5225 
--- , -. f SALESPERSON 1- JOB I PAYMENT TERMS I DUE DATE 1 
I 
SALES TAX 
1,903.13 
Make all checks payable to [Your Company Name] 
30 Days 
QUANTITY 
112 SF 
224 SF 
. ,. . . I . . ,  
. , ,. 
Due upon receipt Shawn 
UNIT PRICE 
$ 3.24 
S 2.02 
DESCRIPTION 
Hang and finish drywall 
Texture Wail 
Repairs to bedroow 
LINE TOTAL 
$ 362.88 
$ , 452.48 
92.16 
190.40 
52.50 
144.06 
27.30 
163.35 
85.00 
85.00 - 
248.00 
$ 1,903.13 
128 SF Insulate Exterior foundations wall 0.72 
P 
224 SF 
42 LF 
42 LF 
42 LF 
330 Miles 
1 LS 
1 LS 
1 LS 
Paint walls 2 walls 
Paint Trim on two walls including window trim 
lnstali Trim 
Patch and touch up trim 
Travel 
Took 
Screws/ Hardware Misc 
Over Head and Profit 
--- 
' All prices are from RS Means Construction Cost Data 2007 Edition 
--
$ 0.85 
S 1.25 
$ 3.43 
$ 0.65 
49.5 CentslMile 
$ 40.00 
85.00 
15% 
SUBTOTAL 
LOWE'S HIW, INC. 
650 BULLOCK STREET 
POCATELLO, I D  83202 (208)236-8900 i 
-SALE- 
SALES #: FSTLANE3 13 11-02-07 
250605 SHEETROCK TOTAL J 7.56 
193025 EXTENSION SPRING 29.54 
2 9  14.77 
SUBTOTAL: 37.10 
TAX: 
2.23 
INVOICE 06775 TOTAL: 39.33 
BALANCE DUE: 39.33 
M/C : 39.33 
M/C XXXXXXXXXXXX5025 340098 
AMOUNT : 39.33 
2587 TERMINAL: 06 11/02/07 16: 15:33 
# OF ITEMS PURCHASED: 3 
EXCLUDES FEES, SERVICES AND 
SPECIAL ORDER ITEMS 
THANK YOU 
FOR SHOPPING LOWE'S 
RECEIPT REQUIRE0 FOR CASH REFUND. 
CHECK PURCHASE REFUNOS REQUIRE 
15 DAY WAIT PERIOD FOR CASH BACK. 
STORE MGR: JEFF KOCH 
HAVE A COMMENT OR FEEDBACK? 
LET US KNOW AT 
WWW .LOWES .COM/FERlBACK 
STORE CODE: 25871-10207-06775 
LOWE'S HIW, INC. 
650 BULLOCK STREET 
POCATELLO, I D  83202 (208)236-8900 
-SALE- 
SALES #: FSTLANE2 13 11-03-07 
13484 PFJ BASE 3406 2 1 
160272 PFJ BASE 713 3 11, 
44899 DAKOTA SGL CYL H k  
5893 3/4" STANDARD FIN 
63599 6 WIRE SRF MT MOO 
87322 HZ GLD NRW BTN W/ 
196558 2-5/B" LARGE SCRE 
196555 2-3/16" LARGE SCR 
196593 2-1/8"OPEN "S" HO 
245458 7/8" SWIVEL ANIM 
40353 11" PLASTIC TRAY 
2 9 0.67 
5993 3 PC GENERAL PURP 
245256 2" SINGLE SWIVEL 
I SUBTOTAL: 115.39 
TAX: 
6.93 
INVOICE 05306 TDTAL: , 122.32 
BALANCE DUE: 122.32 
M/C : 122.32 
M/C XXXXXXXXXXXX5025 blfi1lB 
AMOUNT : 122.32 
2587 TERMINAL: 05 11/03/07 13:57:11 
# OF ITEMS PURCHASED: 14 
EXCLUDES FEES. SERVICES AND 
SPECIAL ORDER ITEMS 
THANK YOU 
FOR SHOPPING LOWE'S 
RECEIPT REQUIRED FOR CASH REFUND. 
CHECK PURCHASE REFUNDS REQUIRE 
15 OAY WAIT PERIOD FOR CASH BACK. 
STORE MGR: JEFF KOCH 
HAVE A COMMENT OR FEEDBACK'? 
LET US KNOW AT 
wwu .LOWES . CoM/FEEOBACK 
STORE CODE: 25871-10307-05306 
LONE'S HIM, INC. 
650 BULLOCK STREET 
POCRTELLO, I 0  83202 
(208)236-8900 
-SRLE- 
SRLES 8 :  S2587SNl 1134754 10-06-07 
11730 GYPSUM 4x8 112 I N  REGULRR 32.68 
4 8 , 8.17 
91109 R13 KRRFT 106.56SQ' 1 Y X 9  32.77 
43.96 DISCOUNT EACH -11.19 
SUBTOTRL: 6 5 4 5  
TRX: 3.93 
INUOICE 02180 TOTRL: 69.38 /' 
, . 
BRLRNCE DUE: 69.38 
" MIC: 69.38 
TQTQL DISCQUMT: 11.19 
HIC XXXXXXXXXXXX5025 697058 
RMOUNT: 69.38 
2587 TERMINAL: 02 10106l01 09:38:18 
# O F  I T E M S  PURCHOSED: 5 
EXCLUDES FEES, SERVICES AND SPECIRL ORDER ITEMS 
THRNK YOU 
,.,., FOR SHOPPIE16 LOME'S 
< 
&c"" /" RECEIPT REQUIRED FOR CRSH REFUND. 
./* CHECK PURCHASE REFUNDS REQUIRE 15 DRY ilRIT PERIOD FOR CRSH BACK. 
, /' STORE 248 JEFF KOCH 

Estimate 
Str~~etorelContenfs 
Combined 
BEST CP~EAN CAKE 
858 JONES DRaVE 
POCATELLO, 83201 
Phone: (208) 238-0858 FAX: (208) 238-81 15 
Cnstomer Job Location 
Company: Site Contact: 
Castomer Mame: LINDA BROWN Site Address 1: 2300 DARREL LOOP 
Address 1: 2300 DARRFL LOOP Site A d d m  2: 
Address 2: City, State, Zip: POCATELLO, ID 82301 
City, State, Zip: POCATELLO, ID 82301 Localion Phone #: (208) 235-5225 
B'3srae Ybone: (208) 235-,%5 hcs60~ 90s: R (208) 239-1380 
Business Phone: (208) 239-1380 LoeationTFaxR ( ) - 
]Fax Number: u--- 
4 22i6 Estimator: SALLY Estimate: LINDA BROWN BILLING 
laster  Bedroom - 10' 11" x 14' 0" x 7' 7" 
Total for Master Bedroom: 
$4,714.75 
SW 152.83 SFW 377.90 SFC 152.83 CF 1,158.99 PER 49.83 
tem # Item Description #Units  U/M Unit Cost Ext. Cost 
1 Certified & trained technician 14.50 HRS $67.54 $979.33 
M,T,W 
2 Trained ass%tants 
h2T,W 
3 Set up & preparation of safe area 
4 Hepa vacuum floors including filters 
5 Tyvek disposable clothing 
M,T 
6 Gloves - puncture proof - per pair 
7 FULL-face mask-whepa filter 
M,T 
8 Gloves - latex - per pair 
M,T 
9 Remove & discard contaminated base moldmg 
10 Remove & discard contaminated tack strip 
11 Remove & discard contaminated carp& - strip c a  &bag 
12 Remove contaminated insulation baits from walls 
13 Remove contaminated drywall from walls - single layer 
14 Furnish 6 c.y. dump bin 
CHANGE DEPENDING ON TLME 
15 Bio-wash wlantimicrobial, rinse &wipe down walls - 2 
applications 
16 Bio-wash w/antimicrobial, rinse &wipe down door & jamb 
17 Pressure wash & treat w/antimicrobial 
18 Bia-wash w/antimiaobial. rinse &vacuum floors - 2 
applications 
19 Bio-wash wlantimicrobial, rinse &wipe down ceilings 
20 Negative air macbine 1 Air scrubber - lazge 
M,T 
CHANGEOVER 
21 Bags for removed blown insulation 
M,T 
22 Replace p~imary & secondary filters 
M,T 
23 Replace HEPA filter 
M,T 
24 OSHA required bio-wash down of men & equipment 
25 Re- to job site to remove all equipment - minimum 
charge 
26 Double layer masking - Full containment 
15.50 HRS $43.81 
152.83 SFF $1.49 
152.83 SFF $0.04 
4.00 EA $14.25 
26.00 LF $0.36 
52.00 LF $0.32 
152.83 SFF $0.46 
20.00 SF $0.10 
40.00 SF $0.46 
1.00 EA $1 15.00 
377.90 SFW $0.84 
2.00 EA $13.91 
152.83 SFF $0.84 
152.83 ' SFF $1.04 
152.83 SFC $0.91 
5.00 DAYS $115.00 
4.00 SET $19.50 
153.00 SF $0.54 
- 
Total for Master Bedroom items: 
.. . ... - . ... - -  . 
Date Printed 11/2/2007 Report : Structure 1 5~;ents  Combined Page Number 2 
".J 
.>f 
,&f 224a Estinato~: SALLY Estimate: LINDA BROWN BILLDIG 
) .  
fl 
Total for Master Bath - 
faster Bath - 6' 1" x 18' 8" x 7' 7" $561.47 
SFF 113.56 SFW 375.38 SFC 113.56 CF861.13 PER 49.50 
tem # Item Description #Units U/M Unit Cost Ext. Cost 
1 Bio-wash wlantimicrobial rinse &wipe down walls - 2 375.38 SFW $0.84 $315.32 
applications 
2 Bio-wash w/antimicrobia& rinse & wipe down door & jamb 1.00 EA $13.91 $13.91 
3 Bio-wash wlantimicrobial. rinse & vacuum Boors - 2 113.56 SFF $1.04 $118.10 
applications 
4 Bio-wash wlantimicrobial, rinse &wipe down ceilings 113.56 SFC $0.91 $103.34 
5 Double laver maskine. - Full containment 20.00 SF $0.54 $10.80 
- 
. . , . . . . . , . . . . . , .  , 
Total for Master Bath items: 
... ... . . .  
$561.47 
Total for Walk-in Closet-2: 
Walk-in Closet-2 - 2' 4" x 10' 11" x 7' 7" $218.47 
SFF 25.47 SFW 200.96 SFC 25.47 CF 193.16 PER 26.50 
[tern # Item Description # Units U/M Unit Cost Ext. Cost 
1 Bio-wash wlantimicrobia& rinse & wipe down walls - 2 200.96 SFW $0.84 $168.81 
applications 
2 Bio-wash w/antimicrobial. rinse & vacuum floors - 2 
applications 
3 Bio-wash wlantimicrobial, rinse & wipe down ceilings 
25.47 SFF $1.04 $26.49 
25.47 SFC $0.91 $23.18 
Total for Walk-in Closet-2 items: $218.47 
Date Printed 11/2/2007 Report : Structure I P-"tents Combined Page Number 3 : 252 

/ 
, Summit Environmental, Im. 
795 S. Orchard St. 
Boise, ID 83705 
Statement 
i Date I 
To: 
L i d a  Browo 
2300 Darrell Loop 
PocaieUo, ID 83201 
Date 
1Z3 112006 
09/28/2007 
11/15/2007 
CURRENT 
Amount Due 
$3,322 58 
Amount 
1,485.10 
1,837.48 
OVER 90 DAYS 
Amount Enc. 
Balance 
0 00 
1,485.10 
3,322 58 
Transaction 
Balance forward 
436.001.01 - 2300 Darrell Loop, Pocatello- 
INV #703-703 
INV #703-726. 
Amount Due 
$3,322.58 
1 
PAST DUE 
0.00 
61-90 DAYS PAST 1-30 DAYS PAST 
DUE 
0.00 
31-60 DAYS PAST 
DtlE 
- 
1,485.10 1,837.48 
DUE 
0 00 

Paaes Proposal -) 
JoHn's Paint & Glass, Inc. 
P.O. Box 72 - 1060 S. Main 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
(208) 233-1050 - 1-800477-1053 
2300 Dane11 Loop 
CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE I JOB LOCATION 
Fax (208) 233-0449 
We hereby submit specificati 
DATE 
5-21-2007 
PROPOSAL SUBMiTTED TO 
Linda Brown 
TOTAL: $654.04 
PHONE 
235-5225 
To furnish and install 1-4030 Certainteed Slim series white vinyl casement/picture window, 
With Low-E glass. This bid includes recasing the interior and trimming the exterior of the 
Window. 
We Propose hereby to furnish material and labor - complete in accordance with above specifications, for the sum o t  
Payment to be made as follows: 
STREET 
I 
All material is guaranteed to be as specified. Ail work to be completed in a Authorized 
workmanlike manner according to standard Practices. Any alteration or Signature 
deviation from above specifications involving extra costs will be executed I 
only upon Wrinen orders, and will become an extra charge over and above 
the estimate. All agreements conlingent upon strikes, accidents or delays 
beyond our control. Owner to carry fire, tomado and other necessary This proposai may be withdrawn by if not accepted 
insurance. Our workers are fuiiy covered by Wokmen's Compensation within 60 days. 
, Insurance. 
JOB NAME 
. . 
,? 
,,. 
.., . Signature . . Acceptance of Proposal -The above prices, specifications and 
conditions are satisfactory and are hereby accepted. You are authorized to do 
t.......... mn*ifinrl D-\nnont>l8ill ha -.an .. nt,t$:norl .hmm 256 
r d q e  Nr 
P-- = Proposal 
JoHn's Paint & Glass, Inc. 
P.O. Box 72 - 1060 S. Main 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
(208) 233-1050 - 1-800-477-1053 
2300 Darrell Loop 
CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE I JOB LOCATION 
Fax (208) 233-0449 
To furnish and install 1-4030 Certainteed Slim series white vinyl'caseinentlpichtre window, 
With Low-E glass. This bid includes recasing the interior and trimming the exterior of the 1 Window. - 
TOTAL: $654.04 
DATE 
5-21 -2007 
PROPOSAL SUBMITTED TO 
Linda Brown 
I1 Payment to be made as follows: 
PHONE 
235-5225 
All material is guaranteed to be as specified. All work to be completed in a Aull 
workmanlike manner according to standard practices. Any alteralion or Sigr 
deviation from above speciflrations involving extra costs will be executed 
only upon written orders, and will become an extra charge over and above 
the estimate. All agreements contingent upon strikes, accidents or delays 
beyond our control. Owner to carry fire, tornado and other necsssaw Noti 
insurance. Our workers are fully covered by Workmen's Compensation with 
Insurance. 
I SIXBET 
Acceptance of Proposal - rne above prices, spec~hcations and 
cui~o~llons are satisfanory and are hereby accepted You are authorized lo do 
the work as specifieo Payment r,dl be made as outl8ned above 
JOB NAME 
CUSTOMER'S ORDER NO DATE 
ADDRESS 
CITY. STATE. ZIP 
[I Date of Acceptance S i v  
367 

Edged in Stone Inc. Estimate 
880 Redman St. 
Chubbuck, ID 83202 
Name I Address 
Linda Brown 
2300 Dane1 Loop 
Pocateflo, Id. 83201 
Estimate # 
5/5/2008 
I Project 
Total 
1,710.00 
660.00 
1,032.00 
300.00 
75.00 
1,680.00 
Description , 
Tear down and rebuild boulder retaining wall as needed due to 
erosion caused by water draioing off Pocatello Creek road. Remove 
sod and grade down soil Skidloader, opemtor and two laborers. 
hstd sod. e~.sting needs to be removed due to erosion buildup 
and damage that wil l  be caused in repairing boulder wall. 
Remove existing cedar fence .for access into backyard. Reinstall 
new cedar fence. Due to the condition of the existing fence removal 
for access will destroy material and require new material for 
replacement 
Remove and replace cedar gate and replace hardware. 
Install top soil as needed to replace eroded soil above and behind 
boulder waU 
Remove and replcice weed baner and sbiedded bark abo-ve bou:der 
259 
(lly 
18 
1,650 
48 
1 
1 
800 
Cost 
95.00 
0.40 
21.50 
300.00 
75.00 
2.10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certifl that on this 30th day of June, 2008 I faxed and mailed a copy of the 
foregoing to Blake G.  Hall and Sam L. Angel1 of Anderson, Nelson, Hall & Smith, P.A., 
490 Memorial Drive, Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630, Fax 523-7254. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA BROWN - Page 18 
Brown v. City ofPocatello 
Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852) 
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775) 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTEED 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 235-4200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable David C. Nye 
LINDA BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
1 Case No. CV-2007-3303-OC 
) 
VS. 
) PLAINTIFFvS RESPONSE ) 
) IN  OPPOSITION TO 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a Municipal ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
Corporation, ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
Defendant. ) 
INTRODUCTION 
This is Plainttrs Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Filed previously by Plaintiff are Plaintzrs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Memorandum Supporting Plaintws Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Affidavit ofLinda Brown, and Afidavit of Counsel. The substance of those filings is 
incorporated herein. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOT10N FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1 
Brown v. Ciiy ofPocatello 
SUMMARY OF AROUMENTS 
Defendant does not contend that the roadwork in question did not cause the 
flooding, nor that Plaintiffs home and property were not damaged by the post-roadwork 
flooding, rather Defendant makes two tort claims act arguments: immunity under the tort 
claims act and deficient tort claim notice. 
Contrary to Defendant's claim, there is no immunity under the discretionary 
function, Idaho Code $6-904(7) as the "plan or design" of the road is not a discretionary 
function. Second, Defendant has not established the elements of Idaho Code $ 6-904(7) 
as to a "plan or design for construction of roads" as there has been no allegation that this 
road work was actually done according to and according to any alleged plan for which 
immunity is claimed. 
Additionally, Defendant's claim that the tort claim notice is deficient is 
totally contrary to caselaw and the purposes behind the Tort Claim notice requirements. 
Finally, the Idaho Tort Claims Act does not even apply to abatement and 
injunctive relief and the ConstitutionallFederal claims of Plaintiff. 
PlaintifPs Claims 
Plaintiff has further set forth bases in her Motion for Summary Judgment 
and supporting filings which require denial of Defendant's motion. 
The "immunity" of the Tort Claims Act is inapplicable to the Constitutional 
claims and U.S.C. $ 1983 claims that are included in Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2 
Brown v. City of PocateNo 
DefenBant's Facts 
1. Defendant admits "The portion of Pocatello Creek Road at issue is 
owned and maintained by the City of Pocatello." Defendant's Memorandum in Support 
of MotSon for Summary Judgment, p. 1. 
2. Defendant admits "Plaintiffs property sits about twenty feet below 
Pocatello Creek Road, and allegedly took on water fiom the road as a result of the 
reconstruction project." Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, pp. 1-2. This has not been disputed. 
3. "The Pocatello Creek Road reconstruction project was identified as a 
critical transportation need by ... the City of Pocatello in the late 1990's .... The process was 
started to create a design and pl an.... The City of Pocatello allotted funds for an 
engineering consulting firm to be hired to create the plan and design specifications for the 
project." Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2. 
Plaintiff's Prior Facts 
4. Plaintiff has lived at 2300 Darrell Loop, Pocatello, Idaho, since April 
15,2001. Linda Brown Deposition 4:25-5:7 (See Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit A). 
5. The Defendant City of Pocatello negligently altered and reconstructed 
the Pocatello Creek Road roadway from its prior "water-safe" condition so as to create, 
among other things, a new roadway depression and water run-off pattern that had not 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 4 
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
previously existed was created and that did not damage adjacent private properties. 
Affidavit of Linda Brown, 74. 
6.  The roadway as reconstructed in the summer of 2005 allowed roadway 
water to pool on and adjacent to the roadway as there was no adequate design or means 
to properly and safely divert water without it passing onto Plaintiffs property. Linda 
Brown Deposition 108:25-109:7. 
7. Prior to this 2005 road construction, neither Plaintiffs home, nor yard, 
had been flooded from roadway water. Linda Brown Depositson 12:f2-19; 64:20-65:6. 
8. Following the 2005 Pocatello Creek Road construction, Plaintiffs yard 
and home has been subjected to numerous, frequent and inevitable flooding occasions of 
flooding by water coming off of Pocatello Creek Road. Amdavit of Linda Brown, 76. 
9. Ultimately -but only after this lawsuit was filed - did the City add an 
asphalt-to-cement barrier to keep roadway water on the road shoulders and stop the 
flooding from runoff into Mrs. Brown's yard and home. Affidavit of Linda Brown, n7. 
10. The Memorandum Supporting Plaintzf's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, contains photographs evidencing the new pooling water (p. 5), water pouring 
under the backyard fence (p. 8), and some of the damage (p. 8-1 1). 
1 1. Defendant has never contended that Plaintiffs home and property was 
not damaged, flooded, mold and uninhabitable. 
12. Defendant relies entirely on Idaho Tort Claims Act immunity. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 5 
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
IDAHO TORT C U I M S  ACT 
The Idaho Tort Claims Act only applies to those areas where a private 
person or entity could be liable. 
$6-903. Liability of governmental entities -- Defense of employees 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, every 
governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages 
arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or 
omissions and those of its employees acting within the course 
and scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out 
of a governmental or proprietary function, where the 
governmental entity ifaprivateperson or entity would be 
liable for money damages under the laws of the state of 
Idaho, provided that the governmental entity is subject to 
liability only for the pro rata share of the total damages 
awarded in favor of a claimant which is attributable to the 
negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions of the 
governmental entity or its employees. 
- Idaho Code g 6-903 ' 
$ 6-904. Exceptions to governmental liability 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within 
the course and scope of their employment and without malice 
or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: 
1. Arises out of any act or omission of an 
employee of the governmental entity exercising 
ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution 
or performance of a statutory or regulatory 
function, whether or not the statute or regulation 
be valid, or based upon the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty on the 
' All bold and italics in this Response in Opposition have been added unless otherwise noted. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE I N  OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTlON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 6 
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
part of a governmental entic or employee 
thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused. 
7. Arises out of a plan or design for construction 
or improvement to the highways, roads, streets, 
bridges, or other public property where such 
plan or design is prepared in substantial 
conformance with engineering or design 
standards in effect at the time of preparation of 
the plan or design or approved in advance of the 
construction by the legislative body of the 
governmental entity or by some other body or 
administrative agency, exercising discretion by 
authority to give such approval. 
- Idaho Code g 6-904(1) and (7). 
Ina~~licabilitv of the Tort Claims Act 
The Tort Claims Act cannot create immunity where that immunity has 
already been abrogated: 
"'Municipal defenses -- including an assertion of 
sovereign immunity -- to a federal right of action are, of 
course, controlled by federal law.' Owen v. City of 
Independence, 445 U.S., at 647, n. 30. 'By including 
municipalities with the class of 'persons' subject to liability 
for violation of the Federal Constitution and laws, Congress 
-- the supreme sovereign on matters of federal law -- 
abolished whatever vestige of the State's sovereign 
immunity the municipaitypossessed.' Id., at 647-648." 
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376 (U.S. 1990). 
The Defendant cannot claim immunity by the Tort Claims Act for 
Constitutional and federal claims. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 7 
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED 
IMMUNITY UNDER THE TORT CLAIMS ACT 
Defendant claims immunity for the flooding based upon Idaho Code $6- 
904(1) and (7). Defendant's claims are contradictory as there cannot be both. see, 
Bingham v. Idaho Dep't of Transp., 117 Idaho 147, 149-150, 786 P.2d 538 (1989). 
Defendant claims by conclusion that the "decision to make improvements to 
Pocatello Creek Road was a decision involving the 'financial, political, economic, and 
social' aspects of the community" and therefore the decision was an immune 
"discretionary function." Defendant's Memorandum On Support of Motion for 
summary Judgment, p. 2. The Defendant provides zero fact basis for the argument that 
the decision to notproperly drain the roadway thereby flooding Plaintiffs property was a 
"financial, political, economic, or social" decision - or that the plan even called for such 
a design. 
Regardless of that improper conclusion, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
already held that the plan or design of a road is not a discretionary function: 
"Contrary to the district court's holding, the plan or 
design of a highway is not immune from liability under 
Subsection (l)." Subsection (1) may insulate the 
Transportation Department from liability for having exercised 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 8 
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
its discretion by deciding (or not deciding) to make a plan or 
design for Highway 39 in the first place. However, once the 
Department has made the decision to plan and design the 
highway, it must comply with the two requirements of 
Subsection (8) to be immune from any suit arising out of 
thatplan or design." 
- Bingham v. ldaho Dep't of Transp., 117 ldaho 147, 
449-150,786 P.2d 538 (1989). 
In this case, once the City decided "'to plan and design the highway, it must 
comply" with requirements of Subsection (7) "to be immune from any suit arising out of 
that plan or design." 
Summary Judgment as to Idaho Code $6-904(1) should be denied. 
Defendant Has Not Satisfied Its Burden Under Idaho Code S 6-904(7) 
Defendant also claims immunity under Idaho Code $ 6-904(7) and 
concludes that "all of the elements which the City of Pocatello is required to establish in 
order to take advantage of immunity provided in subsection (7) have been conclusively 
established." Defendant's Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
The Defendant alleges immunity arguing that Plaintiff's claim: 
7. Arises out of a plan or design for construction or 
improvement to the highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other 
public property where such plan or design is prepared in 
substantial conformance with engineering or design standards 
in effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design or 
approved in advance of the construction by the legislative 
Idaho Code $6-904(8) has been renumbered as Idaho Code $ 6-904(7). 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 9 
Brown v. City ofPocatel10 
269 
body of the governmental entity or by some other body or 
administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to 
give such approval. 
- Rdaho Code g 6-904(7) 
Defendant Has Never Alleged that Anv Plan Was Followed 
Defendant claims that there was a "plan" but never alleges that this plan 
was followed and therefore Defendant has failed to establish that the claim "Arises out of 
a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets, ..." 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
POINT TWO 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE WAS PROPER AND SUFFICIENT 
Defendant claims that "plaintiff filed a notice of tort claim that specifically 
related back to an incident of flooding which allegedly occurred in February 2006 .... there 
was never a subsequent notice of tort claim filed." Defendantjs Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. I*. This argument is based upon the repeated 
flooding of Plaintiffs home after initial flooding. 
Defendant fails to cite a single authority on this point and merely concludes 
that the Plaintiffs notice is insufficient for notice of later flooding. Caselaw makes it 
clear that Plaintiffs Notice was proper and filed even if she did not yet know the full 
extent of her damages. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 10 
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
Plaintiff's April 25,2006 Notice - Within Two Months of Damape 
Plaintiffs home initially flooded February 28,2006; when she came home 
from work at the PMC to find her "basement was entirely covered in water" from "three 
inches deep" to "a half inch deep." Linda Brown Deposition 8:ll-24; Affidavit of Linda 
Brown, 711. 
Defendant admits that "April 17,2006 was the fist date that Defendant 
became aware of Plaintiffs claim of water run off damages." Answer to Interrogatory 
No. 6 (See Atfidavit of Counsel, Exhibit C, p. 3). 
Plaintiff filed a "Claim for Damages or Injury" dated April 25,2006 with 
the City of Pocatello, and reported the "Flooding to basement & backyard" and included 
photos and described the flooding since the Pocatello Creek Road work alterations. 
Affidavit of Linda Brown, u20, Exhibit A; (See also Atfidavit of Lindell Turner, Exhibit 
E, evidencing reeeipt by Defendant). 
Contents of the Claim/Notice 
Idaho Code $6-907 sets forth the requirement of the contents of the claim: 
"All claims presented to and filed with a governmental entity 
shall accurately describe the conduct and circumstances 
which brought about the injury or damage, describe the injury 
or damage, state the time and place the injury or damage 
occurred, state the names of all persons involved, if known, 
and shall contain the amount of damages claimed, together 
with a statement of the actual residence of the claimant at the 
time of presenting and filing the claim and for a period of six 
(6) months immediately prior to the time the claim arose. If 
the claimant is incapacitated from presenting and filing his 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page I 1  
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
271 
claim within the time prescribed or iftlie claimant is a minor 
or if the claimant is a nonresident of the state and is absent 
during the time within which his claim is required to be filed, 
the claim may be presented and filed on behalf of the 
claimant by any relative, attorney or agent representing the 
claimant. A claimfiled under theprovisions of this section 
shall not be held invalid or insufficient by reason of an 
inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or cause of the 
claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown that the 
governmental enti@ was in fact misled to its injury thereby. 
The Supreme Court has held that even a claim which failed to set forth any 
monetary amount was sufficient under this section. A letter that did not even set forth 
an amount of damages and was sent by Plaintiffs insurer to the city's insurance was 
sufficient and "were adequate in light of the final proviso of that section" of Idaho Code 
5 6-907, and in light of that final proviso, the "letter in this case certainlyput the ci@ on 
notice that a claim against it was beingpursued. Thus, the city not only knew of 
Smith's accident but knew also that a claim against it based on that accident would be 
prosecuted. This case does not involve the situation where the governmental entity had 
"actual notice of the injury" but no notice of the claim." Smlth v. Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 
621-22,586 P.2cd 1062 (1978). 
In this case, Plaintiff certainly put the City on notice of the flooding and the 
pursuit of that claim. 
Put the Reasonable Person on Inauiry Notice 
The standard is when a "reasonably prudent" person should inquire: 
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"This Court has held that the notice requirement begins 
running when a person is aware of such facts that would cause 
a reasonably prudent person to inquire further into the 
circumstances surrounding the incident even ifthe full extent 
of damages and the government's role are not known at the 
time. Mitchell v. Bingham Mammal Hosp., 130 Idaho 420, 
423,942 P.2d 544,547 (1997). 
- Cobble v. City of Challis, 138 ldaho 154,157,59 P.3d 959 (2002) 
The Plaintiff did not know the 1 1 1  extent of her damages when she filed her 
Notice, but she placed the City on notice of the flooding as required. 
Purpose of the Notice Provision 
'The purpose of IC fi 6-906 is to (1) save needless expense and litigation 
by providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between parties, 
(2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to 
determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to prepare 
defenses." Cobble v. City of Challis, 138 ldaho 154, 157,59 P.3d 959 (2002). 
It is clear that Plaintiffs initial notice accomplished those three goals. It 
attempted to "(1) save needless expense and litigation by providing an opportunity for 
amicable resolution of the differences between parties," even though the City chose to 
deny the claim and deny a permanent remedy before filing suit; it "(2) allowed] 
authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to 
determine the extent of the state's liability," and it (3) "allowed] the state to prepare 
defenses." The Notice did exactly what it was intended to do. 
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The fact that later floods occurred because of the City's failure to correct 
the flooding is not because of any deficiency in the Notice - the City was on Notice and 
not "misled to its injury" - and chose not to act to permanently rededicate the flooding. 
POINT THREE 
THE CITY OWNS THE ROAD AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
VIOLATING THE LAW OF NATURAL SERVITUDE 
OF NATURAL DRAINAGE BETWEEN ADJOINING LANDS 
Defendant claims that it is not liable for any work done by Parsons "which 
allegedly caused Plaintiffs damages ... because Jack B. Parsons Companies ... was an 
independent contractor" and "Under plaintiffs general negligence theory, the City of 
Pocatello is entitled to immunity." Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 12. 
Defendant's argument relates to general negligence and not the nuisance, 
constitutional inverse condemnation, or federal 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 claims. 
It is undisputed that the "portion of Pocatello Creek Road at issue is owned 
and maintained by the City of Pocatelio." Defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. I; Answer to Request for Admission No. 4. 
The Supreme Court has set forth the law that the City is not allowed to 
expand and improve, draining water where it did not drain previously: 
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This court adheres to the civil law rule (as opposed to 
the common enemy rule. Annot. 59 A.L.R.2d 421 [1958]) 
which recognizes a natural servitude of natural drainage 
between adjoining lands so that the lower owner must accept 
the "surface" water which naturally drains onto his land. 
Loosli v. Heseman, 66 Idaho 469, 162 P.2d 393 (1945). 
However, in Teeter v. Nampa and Meridian Irrigation Dist., 
19 Idaho 355, 114 P. 8 (191 I), it was held that waters could 
not be artificially accumulated and then cast upon lower lands 
in unnatural concentrations. 
Before the expansion of the City of Burley into the 
area where it constructed the system of curbs and gutters and 
storm drains, the surface waters from rain and melting snow 
percolated into this ground and there was no flow of this 
water. Upon the expansion of the city into this new area the 
ability of the land to absorb this surface water was lost; and 
the city to remove the surface water constructed the curbs, 
gutters and storm drain sewers, effectively concentrating into 
a small area the accumulated surface water. In Levee v. City 
ofSalem, 191 Or. 182,229 P.2d 255 (1951), the Supreme 
Court of Oregon held that a city has no right to artificially 
collect drain water from a drain system and cast them upon 
the lands of another in uiznatural volumes even though they 
were turning the waters so collected into a watercourse. This 
same principal was discussed by this court in Teeter v. 
Nampa and Meridian Irrigation Dist., supra. 
- Dayley v. Burley, 96 Idaho 101, 103-104, 524 P.2d 1073 (1974). 
The City as the owner of this road cannot shift the blame to someone else 
for duties it owes -the flooding has created a nuisance. This case is not even one where 
the city is casting additional waters into a "watercourse," this is casting water onto 
Plaintiff's residential property - her home! 
The City is violating the law of "natural servitude of natural drainage 
between adjoining lands." 
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POINT FOUR 
THE IDAHO TORT CLAlMS ACT 
DOES NOT APPLY TO NON-MONETARY CLAIMS 
Additionally, Defendant's motion should be denied to the extent that non- 
monetary claims are being sought. The Tort Claims Act specifically references and 
applies to "money damages." ldaho Code 9 6-903. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that only claims for money 
damages are subject to the tort claim notice requirements. Cobble v. Ciw of Challis, 138 
ldaho 154, 157, 59 P.3d 959,962 (2002)(Uabatement of a nuEsanceR is not "an action 
to recover damagesm and therefore is not 6Gsubject to the constraints of the notice 
requirements under the Tort Claims Act"; "claim for abatement of a nuisance - an 
action that would not be limited by the requirements of the ITCA.'9 
Plaintiff Seeks IniunctionIAbatement Relief 
For a nuisance, "Damages may be recovered along with an injunction or 
abatement." Payne v. Skaar, 127 ldaho 341,345, 900 P.2d 1352 (1995). See also, 
Idaho Code 9 52-301. Plaintiff is also entitled to an Order of Abatement and an 
injunction against further encroachment. 
Abatement is allowed by statute, and allows: 
A person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by 
removing, or, ifnecessary, destroying, the thing which 
constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the 
peace, or doing unnecessary injury. 
- ddaho Code 0 52-302 
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Defendant admittedly did not make any "permanent" repair prior to filing 
this lawsuit and did so only after being served in this case. Similar to Dayley v. Burley, 
96 Idaho 101, 103,524 P.2d 1073 (1974): 
The "city had no right to discharge waters into the remnants 
of the Goose Creek channel which crossed the plaintiffs' 
lands or to construct storm sewers which would discharge 
waters and encroach on the plaintiffs' properties." 
- Dayley v. Burley, 96 Idaho 101, 103, 524 P.2d 1073 (1974) 
The City had no right to flood Plaintiffs properly. 
Plaintiff requests this Court's Order enjoining the City .from wrongfully 
draining water onto Plaintiffs property and an Order of Abatement specifically allowing 
that in the event of future violations, Plaintiff may abate the nuisance and seek damages 
for that abatement from the Defendmt. 
Plaintiff should be granted summary judgment on this point and should not 
have been forced to file this lawsuit to obtain this relief. 
POINT FIVE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION DOES NOT EVEN APPLY TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL lNVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIMS 
AND 42 U.S.C. 9 1983 CLAIM 
Defendant has moved for summary judgment exclusively on Idaho Tort 
Claims bases. Those bases do not even apply to constitutional inverse condemnation and 
federal 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 claims. 
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Federal and State Constitution 
The United States Constitution prohibits the taking of "private prope rty... 
for public use, withoutjust compensation." U.S. Constitution, Amendment V (Takings 
Clause). 
The Idaho Constitution states: "Private property may be taken for public 
use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, 
shall be paid therefor." Idaho Const. Art. I ,  I, $4 (2008). 
42 U.S.C. 5 1983 
42 U.S.C. 9 1983 states: 
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to theparty injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except 
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act 
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, 
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory 
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For 
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable 
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to 
be a statute of the District of Columbia." 
A municipality is a "person." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) 
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"42 U.S.C. 5 1983 creates a remedy for violations of federal rights 
committed by persons acting under color of state law. State courts as well as federal 
courts have jurisdiction over 5 1983 cases." Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 358 (1990). 
Violation of a person's constitutional rights "would serve as a basis for a $ 
1983 claim." Accredited Home L erh$lers, lnc. v. City of Seattle, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 
48135 (W.D. Wash. July 2,2007). 
Inverse Condemnation 
"Where the United States does not acquire privately owned land statutorily 
but instead physically enters into possession or institutes regulations that restrict the 
land's use, the owner has a right to bring an 'inverse condemnation' action to recover the 
value of the land. Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 4-5. 'Such a suit is 'inverse' because it is 
brought by the affected owner, not by the condemnor. The owner's right to bring such a 
suit derives from the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with 
respect to condemnation. la! at 5 n.6." dlniedSfates K I9I.07Aeres of h n 4  482 F.3d 
1132,1136 (9th Cir. Alaska 2007). 
"An inverse condemnation action, such as the one before us, is 'instituted 
by a property owner who asserts that his property, or some interest therein, has been 
invaded or appropriated to the extent of a taking, but without due process of law, without 
payment of just compensation.' Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,217,596 P.2d 75,89 
(1978). Through her counterclaim for inverse condemnation, Lindsey has not sought 
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compensation for the taking which occurred by virtue of the City's condemnation action, 
but for the City's alleged interference with herproperty rights prior to the initiation of 
the City's condemnation action." City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851,856,853 
P.2d 596 (Idaho Gt. App. 1993). 
Constitutional Violations and 5 1983 Claims Trump State Tort Claims Law 
A "landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as a 
result of 'the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to 
compensation . . . .' Unitedstates v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253,257 (1980), quoting 6 P. 
Nichols, Eminent Domain $25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972). As noted in JUSTICE 
BRENNAN's dissent in Sun Diego Gas & Electric Co., 450 U.S., at 654-655, it has been 
established at least since Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933), that claims for just 
compensation are grounded in the Constitution itself: 
'The suits were based on the right to recover just 
compensation for property taken by the United States for 
public use in the exer~ise of its power of eminent domain. 
That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that 
condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the 
right was asserted in suits by the owners did not change the 
essential nature of the claim. The form of the remedy did not 
qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth Amendment. 
Statutory recognition was not necessary. A promise to pay 
was not necessary. Such a promise was implied because of 
the duty to pay imposed by the Amendment. The suits were 
thus founded upon the Constitution of the United States." Id., 
at 16. (Emphasis added.) 
- First English Evangeliical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304,315 (1 987). 
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The ITCA authorizes tort claims against governmental entities and 
employees for their negligence or wrongful acts or omissions when engaged in activities 
for which an individual could be held liable, Gordon v. Noble, 109 Idaho 1048,1049, 
712 P.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1986). 
It is clear that no individual could be liable for inverse condemnation, 
because it is by definition an uncompensated governmental taking. 
Plaintiffs constitutional claims themselves are founded upon the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Idaho and cannot be 
undone by the Idaho legislature. They are rights that Plaintiff is "entitled to bring ... as a 
result of 'the self-executing character of the constitutional provision" and are "grounded 
in the Constitution itselP' and "guaranteed by the Constitution" and "rested upon the 
Fifth Amendment [and Idaho Const. Art. I, 5 141. Statutory recognition was not 
necessary." First EngNsh EvangeNcalLuilLeran Chum& v. County of Los Angeleq 482 
U.S. 304,315 (1987). 
42 U.S.C. 5 1983 Trumos State Tort Claims 
Additionally, the Idaho Tort Claims Act is trumped by the Federal Civil 
Rights Act which protects against Constitutional violations. 
"The assumed analogy between the federal right created by the Civil Rights 
Act and the state created remedies and immunities found in the Tort Claims Act is 
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ephemeral [or fleeting]. As Mr. Justice Harlan observed concurring in Monroe v. Pape 
(1961) 365 U.S. 167, 196, 81 S. Ct. 473,488,5 L. Ed. 2d 492 'a deprivation of a 
constitutional right is signzjTcanttly d i f fent  from and more serious than a violation of 
a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the same act may 
constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right."' Donovan v. 
RefnboM, 433 F.2d 738, 741-742 (9th Cir. Cal. 1970). 
The Donovan Court noted the supreme nature of the Federal Civil Rights 
Act as relates to a state's sovereign immunity: 
"Congress has not evinced any intention to defer to the states 
the definition of the federal right created in section 1983, or 
to adopt the states' remedies or procedures for the 
vindication of that right. It has never indicated an intent to 
engraft onto the federal right state concepts of sovereign 
immunity or of state susceptibility to suit, which are the 
concepts that are the roots of the California Tort Claims Act. 
Indeed, the history of section 1983, summarized in Monroe v. 
Pape, supra, 365 U.S. 167,81 S. Ct. 473,5 L. Ed. 2d 492, 
vividly demonstrates that state concepts ofsovereign 
immuniq were alien to the purposes to be served by the 
Civil Rights Act. (See also, Beauregard v. Wingard 
(S.D.Ca1.1964) 230 F. Supp. 167, 173.) An incorporation of 
such state created policies "would practically constitute a 
judicial repeal of the Civil Rights Act." (Hoffman v. Halden 
(9th Cir. 1959) 268 F.2d 280,300; Jobson v. Henne (2d Cir. 
1966) 355 F.2d 129.)" Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 
742 (9th Cir. Cal. 1970). 
Sovereipn Immunity Is Controlled bv Federal Law 
"Municipal defenses -- including' an assertion of sovereign immunity -- to a 
federal right of action are, of course, controlled by federal law. By including 
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municipalities with the class of 'persons' subject to liability for violation of the Federal 
Constitution and laws, Congress -- the s u p m e  sovereign on matters of federal law - 
abolished whatever vestige of the State5 sovereign immunity the municipality 
possessed." Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356,376 (U.S. 4990)(citations omitted). 
The Howlett Court continued: 
"Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is 
wronghl under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 or $ 1985(3) cannot be 
immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute 
which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling 
effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory 
promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution 
insures that the proper construction may be enforced." 
- blowlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 358, 376-377 (U.S. 4990). 
The Idaho Supreme Court agrees: 
'The question of immunity from an action predicated upon 
42 U.S.C. $ 1983 is one offederal law. Jones v. Marshall, 
528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.1975); Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 
(6th Cir.1970); Ligon v. State of Maryland, 448 F.Supp. 935 
(D.C.Md.1977); see also Martin v. DufJ, 463 F.2d 464 (10th 
Cir.1972). The notice of claim requirements of IC $6-905 are 
inapplicable to a cause of action brought under 42 U.S.C. $ 
1983. Doe v. Ellis, 103 Wis.2d 581,309 N.W.2d 375 (1981); 
Perrote v. Percy, 452 F.Supp. 604 (E.D.Wis.1978). See also 
Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.1970)." - 
Ovennan v. Kleln, 103 Idaho 795,798-799,664 P.2d 888 
(1982). 
The constitutional claim in Harkness was based on the United States 
Constitution and brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. $ 1983. A state's notice-of-claim 
statute which provides that no action may be brought or maintained against a state 
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government subdivision unless claimant provides written notice within a certain period 
of time is preempted when a federal civil rights action is brought in state court. See 
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988); Overman v. 
Klein, 103 Idaho 795,654 P.2d 888 (1982). Since the constitutional claim in Harkness 
was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. 5 1983, the notice of claim requirement of IC 5 
50-21 9 was preempted by the federal statute and distinguishes Harkness from the instant 
appeal." Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572-576'798 PSd 27 (1990). 
The Citv Attem~ts to Place - and Justify - Placiny Societal Burden on Plaintiff 
The City argues, "It is unfortunate 3, and certainly unforeseeable 4, that 
plaintiff would suffer the damages thgt she has alleged, however, the Idaho Legislature 
has intentionally provided immunity to local governments to be free from this type of 
suit.'" Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 10. 
Defendant's argument is Plaintiff should bear society's burden. 
"It is axiomatic that the Fifth Amendment's just compensation provision is 
'designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bearpublic burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by thepublic as a whole.' Armstrong 
If it truly were "unfortunate" as claimed, then the City would have remedied this flooding prior 
to multiple floods and ultimately requiring the filing of this lawsuit. 
Perhaps the first flooding was "unforeseeable;" however, the subsequent floodings were no 
longer "unforeseeable" and the City could have earlier remedied the problem as to the later "foreseeable" 
flooding. 
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v. United States, 364 U.S., at 49." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County 
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,318-319 (U.S. 1987). 
Fixing the Flooding Does Not Undo the Taking 
The Defendant may argue that it has fixed the flooding. This does not 
absolve it from compensating for the taking. "Where the government's activities have 
already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government 
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking 
was effective." First English E~a~#gelIcaI Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304,321 (U.S. 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
Defendant has not established that any "plan or design" was actually 
followed causing Plaintiffs property to flood. Defendant's motion should likewise be 
denied as to any "non-monetary" and Constitutional/federal claims. 
Plaintiff Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be granted. 
Plaintiffs claims for an injunction and abatement are proper under the 
circumstances where Defendant's road is now casting water on Plaintiffs property 
causing a nuisance and damaging Plaintiff. Plaintiffs constitutional and federal claims 
trump any "sovereign immunity" claimed by Defendant. 
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DATED this 14" day of J U I ~ ,  2008 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 14" day of July, 2008 I faxed a copy of the foregoing to 
Blake G. Hall and Sam L. Angel1 of Anderson, Nelson, Hall & Smith, P.A., 490 
Memorial Drive, Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630, Fax 523-7254, and that a courtesy copy has 
been hand-delivered to the Honorable David C. Nye at his chambers at the Bannock 
County Courthouse. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable DavId C. Nye 
LINDA BROWN, 1 
1 Case No. CV-2007-3303-OC 
Plaint@ ) 
1 
VS. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN 
) SUPPORT OF HER MOTION 1 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a Municipal ) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Corporation, 1 
1 
Defendant. j 
The parties in this case have filed cross Motions for summary judgment. 
This is Plaintiffs Reply supporting her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Filed previously by Plaintiff are (1) Plaintzffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, (2) Memorandum Supporting Plaintt@'s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, ( 3 )  Afidavit ofLinda Brown, (4)  Afidavit of Counsel, and ( 5 )  Plaintt@s 
Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The substance of 
those filings are incorporated herein. 
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SUMMARY OF RESPONSE 
Repealed Law 
Defendant in response argues, first that Plaintiff Complaint does not "set 
forth a cause ofaction for 'nuisance"' and that there is "no such claim or allegation" of 
"inverse condemnation." Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment, p. 5,12. 
Defendant's argument is antiquated law not valid in Idaho since 1958 when 
the statutory Rules of Civil Procedure were repealed. 
Elements in fact are pleaded 
Defendant further argues that Plaintiff has not established a nuisance; to the 
contrary, Plaintiff has established the elements of nuisance as set forth in Idaho Code 
52-101 and 1 1  1 nor the elements of "inverse condemnation." Defendant9 Memorandum 
in Opposition to Summary Judgmnt, p. 5, 12, 13. 
Point One that follows show that in fact the elements of both are pleaded 
and otherwise Plaintiff has established an uncompensated W i g  as evidenced by the 
pleadings, admissions, and Affidavits; that Plaintiffs property has been subjected to 
frequent and recurrent flooding. 
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REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT PROPERLY PLEADS 
NUlSANCE AND INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIMS 
Defendant argues Plaintiffs Complaint does not "set forth a cause of 
action' for 'nuisance"' and there is "no such claim or allegation"of "inverse 
condemnation" or "taking." Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment, p. 5,12, $3. 
Bad Law Since 1958 
Idaho has not required a Complaint to plead a "Cause of Action" since 
1958. Prior to 1958 the statutory Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure required "a statement of 
the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language." Archer v. 
Shields Lumber Co., 91 Idaho 861,867,434 P.2d 79,85 (1967) (quoting Idaho Code 5- 
605). "This is a dgferent standard than what is required today by I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l), 
requiring a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief." Seiniger Law Ofice v. North Pacific Insurance Company, -Idaho - ,2008 
Idaho Lexis 10, 1 1, 178 P.3d 606 (2008). The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure were 
formally adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court on November 1, 1958. 
' Ail italics and bold herein are added unless stated otherwise. 
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Defendant recognizes that under Rule 8(a), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief' is required. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summaty Judgment, p. 
12. Defendant just overlooked "the rest of the story" since 1958 when the words "cause 
of action" were removed from Rule 8 by the Supreme Court. 
Saecific "Legal Theories" Need Not Be Pled - Onlv '"Facts" 
Defendant's argument that Plaintiff has somehow not met the law in not 
setting forth "legal theories" stating "nuisance" and "inverse condemnation" is also not 
the law. It is noteworthy Defendant does not cite to any law that requires the pleading of 
"legal theories." 
"Under the modern form of pleading a complaint need not state the 
speczjic legal theories upon which the plaintiff relies. A simple, concise statement of the 
operative facts is sufJient." Eauer v. Minidoka Sch. Dist., 116 Idaho 586,589,778 
P.2d 336 (1989). That is what Plaintiff did. 
"There is no requirement that a complaint include a statement of the 
various Iegal theories upon which the plaintiff relies. Bauer v. Minidoka School Dist. No. 
331, 116 Idaho 586,589,778 P.2d 336,339 (1989); Collord v. Cooley, 92 Idaho 789, 
793,45 1 P.2d 535, 539 (1969). The purpose of a complaint is to inform the defendant of 
the material facts upon which the plaintiff rests the action." Quinto v. Mirllwood Forest 
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prods., 130 Idaho 162,167,938 P.2d 189, 194 ( ~ t .  ~ p p .  1997). Plaintiff's Complaint 
fully "informed" Defendant of "the material facts." 
Plaintiff's Pleaded Facts Clearlv Satisfy the Reauirement 
Plaintiffs Complaint clearly states the material facts: 
2. Plaintiff Linda Brown is a resident of Pocatello, 
Bannock County, Idaho residing at 2300 Darrell Loop where 
she has lived since April of 2001 .... 
3. Defendant City of Pocatello, is a Municipal 
Corporation located in Bannock County, incorporated under 
laws of the State of Idaho and having responsibility for the 
design and maintenance of the Pocatello Creek Road behiid 
Mrs. Brown's residence. 
4. Prior to the summer of 2005, Plaintiff Linda Brown 
had resided at 2300 Darrell Loop since April of 2001 and had 
never had any water or water runoffdamage to her property 
from water or rain on Pocatello Creek Road. Nor had the 
prior home owners. 
5. In the summer of 2005, primarily July and August, 
Defendant City of Pocatello undertook construction on the 
Pocatello Creek Road behind Plaintiff Linda Brown's home. 
In so doing the Defendant City of Pocatello negligently 
altered and reconstructed the Pocatello Creek Road roadway 
from its prior "water-safe" condition so as to create, among 
other things, a new roadway depression and water run-off 
pattern than had previously existed and that did not damage 
adjacent private properties. 
6. The obvious roadway depression and "cupping" is 
easily seen where the City of Pocatello and Bannock County 
boundaries meet on Pocatello Creek Road. That difference at 
the junction was, and should have been, clear and 
conspicuous to City of Pocatello roadway designers, 
engineers, and workers with resultant recognition of the need 
to deal with roadway water runoff. The completed roadway 
from the City-County junction line did not flow smoothly but 
created a depression and allowed for pooling of water and 
water runoff into Plaintiff's yard and home and ultimately, as 
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more fully set forth herein, requiring protection of Plaintiffs 
home by sandbags. 
7. In February of 2006 with the water runoff of 
springtime the roadway as completed would not properly 
handle water runoff as it had before the summer of 2005 
reconstruction and substantial roadway water was diverted 
onto and into Plaintiffs property and home. 
8. Specifically, the roadway as reconstructed in the 
summer of 2005 allowed roadway water to pool on and 
adjacent to the roadway as there was no adequate design or 
means to properly and safely divert water without it passing 
onto Plainti~jfsproperty; there was not even a drain installed 
on the west boundary of the property though there was a drain 
installed in the roadway on the east boundary of the roadway 
and north of Plaintiffs home. 
9. The reconstructed roadway did not even have a full 
roadway gutter installed in the area behind and north of 
Plaintiffs home and the work as done and completed was not 
even sufficient to divert the water into the partial curbing that 
was constructed on part of the roadway north of Plaintiffs 
property. 
* * * 
12. As a direct and proximate cause of the negligent 
Pocatello Creek Road reconstruction, the roadway water 
flowed off Pocatello Creek Road and under Plaintiffs back 
yard fence carrying debris and soil and rock with it into the 
Plaintzf's yard and across the Plaint~fs  yard and into 
Plaintiffs home through windows and into and down walls 
and onto jloors and under carpeting and into other rooms 
and under tile. 
13. Defendant City of Pocatello previously 
acknowledged that the necessity of sandbags on the road was 
not intended to be nor an appropriate permanent remedy of 
the roadway runoff water condition and assured Plaintiff that 
the Pocatello Creek Road condition complained of herein 
would be corrected this summer but to day has not done so 
though it has done other roadway work inpont of Plaintiff s 
home on Darrell Loop where there was no water issue. 
14. As a direct and proximate cause of the Defendant 
City of Pocatello's negligence and failings as set forth 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF HER 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 6 
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
herein, the Plaintiff has been specially and generally damaged 
in her home and property, cleaning and repair expense, 
replacement expense, resultant mold and loss of use and 
benefit of her home and other damages incidental to all of the 
foregoing. 
- Complaint and Jury Demand, 7171 2-14. 
These "operative factsY%re the same facts on which Plaintiffs rely in 
support of her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. They sufficiently apprise 
Defendant of the "operative facts" (Bauer v. Minidoka Sch. Dist., 116 ldaho 586,589, 
778 P.2d 336 (1989) and the "material facts upon which the plaintiff rests the action." 
Quinto v. MiIlwood Forest Prods., 130 ldaho 162, 167, 938 P.2d 189, I94 (Ct. App. 
1997). 
The "operative" and "material facts" were provided, including the City's 
role as a "municipal corporation" and its alteration of the roadway, such that Plaintiffs 
property was flooded, and suffered damages including the "resultant mold and loss of use 
and benefit of her home." Complaint and Jury Demand, 7115. That is loss of use is 
exactly what inverse condemnation is. 
These facts, among the others set forth in the Complaint, are sufficient. 
Relief Was to Move For a More Definite Statement 
A party may move for a "more definite statement of the claim ... under 
I.R.C.P. 12(e)" if the party feels that the Complaint does not fairly apprise him of the 
basis of the claim against him. Quinto v. MillwoodForest Prods., 130 ldaho 162,167, 
938 P.2d 189,194 (Ct. ~ p p .  1997). Defendant did not do that. 
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Controversies Are to Be Determined on the Merits 
It is long-established law in Idaho, and generally, that controversies should 
be determined and disposed of each on the specific facts of the case as substantial justice 
may require. The proper exercise of judicial discretion should tend to bring about a 
judgment on the merits. Bunn v. Bunn, 99 ldaho 710,711,587 P.2d 1245,1246 (1978). 
The keystone of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is liberality which favors a final 
decision predicated on the merits over a dismissal based upon a technicality. Gerstner v. 
Wash. Water Power Co., 122 ldaho 673,675,837 P.2d 799,801 (1992). 
Rule l(a) is a constant reminder that "a just result is always the ultimate 
goal to be accomplished." Gerstner v. Wash. Waterpower Co., 122 ldaho 673,675,837 
"A 'determination' of an action within the meaning of Rule 1 
is meant to be a determination of the controversy on the 
merits - not a termination on a procedural technicality 
which serves litigants not at all. A determination entails a 
finding of the facts and an application of the law in order to 
resolve the legal rights of thelitigants who hope to resolve 
their differences in the courts. The 'liberal construction' of the 
rules required by Rule 1, while it cannot alter compliance 
which is mandatory and jurisdictional, will ordinarily preclude 
dismissal of an appeal for that which is but technical 
noncompliance. This will be especially so where no prejudice 
is shown by any delay which may have been occasioned." 
Gerstner v. WashB WBkrPower Co., 122 ldaho 673,675, 
837 P.2d 799,801 (1992)(quoting Bunn v. Bunn, 99 ldaho 
710,712,587 P.2d 1245,1247 (1978). 
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What Defendant seeks is not consistent with the long established judicial 
policy of hearing cases on the merits. Plaintiff has met her pleading burden as to the 
"nuisance" and "inverse condemnation" requirements. 
Plaintiff has met her pleading burden as to the "nuisance" and "inverse 
condemnation" requirements. 
PORNT TWO 
DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS CONSTlTUTE A NUISANCE - 
SUBJECT TO MONETARY AND NON-MONETARY RELIEF 
Defendant next contends that Plaintiff's claim for nuisance fails because of 
she has not established, 
(1) the parameters of the 'natural servitude' i.e. the 'natural 
drainage' that she was required to accept. (2) that the City of 
Pocatello 'artificially accumulated' water, and (3) cast said 
water upon her land in 'unnatural concentrations'; and that (4) 
said actions were caused by the City of Pocatello; and that 
said actions (5) were an obstruction to the free use of her 
property." Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment, p. 7. 
Defendant, however, has not cited any law that the above are required to 
establish "nuisance." Defendant is misstating the burden.2 An action for nuisance is 
Notwithstanding that overstatement, Plaintiffs "facts" properly demonstrate a 
history of no prior flooding, that the City is the owner of the road in question, that only 
after the road modification did flooding occur on multiple occasions (i.e. casting of water 
in unnatural concentrations). 
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defined by Idaho Code 5 52-1 11, titled "Actions for Nuisance" which states that a 
nuisance is: 
Anything which is injurious to health or morals, or indecent, 
or ofSensive to the senses, or an obstruction to thefree use of 
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of 
life or property, is a nuisance and the subject of an action. 
Only those set forth in the statute are the requisite elements. Plaintiff has 
satisfied all of those. 
In fact, Plaintiff has established that Defendant violated the law of natural 
servitude of drainage -which is the cause of this nuisance - and as set forth in Dayley 
v. Burley, 96 Idaho 101, 103-104,524 P.2d 1073 (1974): 
"This court adheres to the civil law rule (as opposed to the 
common enemy rule. Annot. 59 A.L.R.2d 421 [1958]) which 
recognizes a natural sx~i tude  of natural drainage between 
adjoining lands so that the lower owner must accept the 
"surface" water which naturally drains onto his land. Loosli 
v. Heseman, 66 Idaho 469, 162 P.2d 393 (1945). However, in 
Teeter v. Nampa and Meridian Irrigation Dist., 19 Idaho 355, 
114 P. 8 (191 l), it was held that waters could not be 
artificially accumulated and then cast upon lower lands in 
unnatural concentrations." 
The City's roadway changes artificially caused the roadway water to 
accumulate until it diverted off through Plaintiff's property causing damage; prior to the 
2005 roadway changes, the roadway water created no problem. 
Plaintiff has thus satisfied the elements of nuisance, (1) Plaintiff has 
demonstrated that the City is the owner of the road in question; (2) that historically she 
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had no flooding; (3) because of the city's change she has subsequently on multiple 
occasions, and (4) suffered flooding, damage and loss of use all of which has been 
"indecent, or ofjrensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use ofproperty, so as 
to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property." 
Plaintiff has demonstrated nuisance. 
Obiection to Defendant's S~eculation 
Defendant argues/speculates that "PlaintifPs installation of a stone 
retaining wall could have affected the absorption rate of the slope between the road and 
her property thereby causing flooding to occur." Defendant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 8. This arglunentjspeculation is just that; not 
supported by any facts, testing, or testimony. Speculation in argument does not create a 
question of fact. Defendantrs Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 8. 
Plaintiff Has Established No Prior Flooding 
Defendant has never disputed the fact of no prior flooding; only after the 
2005 road work did flooding commence. And the photographs of water accumulation on 
the roadway make it obvious that a new problem was born in 2005. 
Defendant's argument seeks to impose a duty to essentially determine a 
historical "volume" of discharge onto plaintiffs property. Defendant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 8. Such has never been required under Idaho law. 
Such was not required in Dayley, "where the surface waters from rain and melting snow 
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percolated into this ground and there was no flow of this water.'" Dayley v. Burley, 96 
Idaho 101, 103-104,524 P.2d 1073 (1974) 
The volume of water entering Plaintiffs home previously was zero! After 
the 2005 road changes, there was a new "run-off pattern" different than existed before 
and as evidenced by the photos. Affidavit of Linda Brown, T/n 4-6. 
Defendant argues that '"she was simply the victim of unusually excessive 
rain and/or snow which overloaded the historical or natural drainage of water off the 
road." Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 9. Again, an 
argument of total speculation -without factual support. What is supported is that 
Plaintiff subsequently suffered regular flooding, and that this flooding did not afect any 
neighbors because the water was only running into . Affidavit of Linda Brown, n4. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden of proving "the 
City of Pocatello caused water to be artificially accumulated." Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 9. Defendant refuses to 
acknowledge the nuisance elements which focuses on the "landowner." It is undisputed 
that the "portion of Pocatello Creek Road at issue is owned and maintained by the City of 
Pocatello." Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
p. 1; Answer to Request for Admission No. 1 (See Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit 6, p. 2). 
Plaintiff has satisfied her burden as to her nuisance claims. 
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POINT THREE 
THE CITY HAS NO NUISANCE IMMUNITY 
Defendant claims immunity for the nuisance claim under the IDAHO TORT 
CLAIMS ACT, Idaho Code C) 6-904(7) relating to construction plans. Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 10. 
Defendant argues there was a "plan" - but never alleges that this "Plan" 
was even followed - so Defendant has failed to establish that the claim "Arises out of a 
plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets, ..." See 
also, Plainfiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
pp. 9-10. 
Plaintiff's Notice Was Sufficient 
Defendant further claims immunity based upon Idaho Code C) 50-219 
claiming that Plaintiffs notice for damages did not state "nuisance" and therefore did not 
comply with the tort claim notice requirements. Defendant's Memorandum In 
Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 90. 
In fact, Idaho Code C) 50-219 only requires notice of the claim be given 
pursuant to Idaho Code $6-901 et seq. Defendant admits that Plaintiff placed it on notice 
of the subsequent flooding but claims that Plaintiff did not plead a legal theory or say 
"nuisance." Defendant's MemoratidDlm in Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 10-11. 
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No Idaho statute requires any person -homeowner or even lawyer - 
plead "a legal theory" in filing a Tort Claim notice. And Defendant cites no law so 
requiring. 
This argument is a diversion from the obvious indifference of the City to the flooding its 
roadway work of 2005 caused. 
Plaintiff filed a timely notice of claim with the City. Defendant cites no 
case - again - to support its position that the failure to use the word "nuisance" makes 
that notice deficient. In fact, Plaintiffs notice is proper as Plaintiff complied with the 
Tort Claim Notice requirements of Idaho Code 6-901 et seq. : 
Idaho Code 5 6-907 sets forth the requirement of the contents of the claim: 
"All claims presented to and filed with a governmental entity 
shall accurately describe the conduct and circumstances 
which brought about the injury or damage, describe the injury 
or damage, state the time and place the injury or damage 
occurred, state the names of all persons involved, if known, 
and shall contain the amount of damages claimed, together 
with a statement of the actual residence of the claimant at the 
time of presenting and filing the claim and for a period of six 
(6) months immediately prior to the time the claim arose. If 
the claimant is incapacitated from presenting and filing his 
claim within the time prescribed or if the claimant is a minor 
or if the claimant is a nonresident of the state and is absent 
during the time within which his claim is required to be filed, 
the claim may be presented and filed on behalf of the 
claimant by any relative, attorney or agent representing the 
claimant. A claimfled under theprovisions of this section 
shall not be held invalid or insufficient by reason of an 
inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or cause of the 
claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown that the 
governmerttal entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby. 
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TOO 
Plaintiffs claim gave the "conduct~and circumstances" as required. The 
Tort Claim notice statute does not require the pleading of legal theories. 
In fact, 'The purpose of IC 5 6-906 is to (1) save needless expense and 
litigation by providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between 
parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in 
order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to 
prepare defenses." Cobble v. City ofChallis, 138 ldaho 154,157,59 P.3d 959 (2002). 
The City had this opportunity; it failed to act. 
The Supreme Court has held that even a claim which failed to set forth any 
monetary amount was sufficient under this section. A letter that did not even set forth 
an amount of damages and was sent by Plaintiffs insurer to the city's insurance was 
sufficient and "were adequate in light of the final proviso of that section" of Idaho Code 
$ 6-907, and in light of that final proviso, the "letter in this case certainlyput the ci@ on 
notice that a claim against it was beingparsued. Thus, the City not only knew of 
Smith's accident but knew also that a claim against it based on that accident would be 
prosecuted. This case does not involve the situation where the governmental entity had 
"actual notice of the injury" but no notice of the claim." Smith v. Preston, 99 ldaho 618, 
621-22,586 P.2d 1062 (1978). 
In this case the City was certainly on notice a claim being pursued -and 
elected not to act. Plaintiffs notice was sufficient. 
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The Tort Claims Immunity and Notice Reauirements 
Do Not A n ~ l v  - -  - to Abatement and Injunctive Relief 
Additionally, and as set forth in detail in Plaint$fs Response in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 16-17, the Tort Claims Act does not 
even apply to Plaintiffs injunctive and abatement relief requested. 
For a nuisance, "Damages may be recovered along with an injunction or 
abatement." Payne v. Skaar, 127 ldaho 341,345,900 P.2d 1352 (1995). See also, 
Idaho Code 8 52-301. In addition to money damages, Plaintiff is also entitled to an 
Order of Abatement and an injunction against further encroachment. 
Abatement is allowed by statute, and allows: 
A person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by 
removing, or, $necessary, destroying, the thing which 
constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the 
peace, or doing unnecessary injury. 
- ldaho Code § 52-302 
The Tort Claims Act specifically applies to "money damages." ldaho Code 
g 6-903. The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that only claims for money damages 
are subject to the Tort Claim Notice requirements. Cobble v. Cify of Challis, 138 ldaho 
154,157, 59 P.3d 959,962 (2002)("abatement of a nuisanceR is not "an action to 
recover damagesy' and therefore is not "subject to the constraints of the notice 
requirements under the Tort Claims Actav; 'Gelaim for abatement of a nuisance - an 
action that would not be limited by the requirements of the ITCAm93 
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Defendant admittedly did not make any "permanent" repair prior to filing 
this lawsuit and did so only after being served in this case. Similar to Dayley v. Burley, 
96 Idaho 101,103,524 P.2d 1073 (1 974): 
The "city had no right to discharge waters into the remnants 
of the Goose Creek channel which crossed the plaintiffs' 
lands or to construct storm sewers which would discharge 
waters and encroach on the plaintiffs' properties." 
- Dayley v. Surley, 96 Idaho 101, 103,524 P.2d 1073 (1974) 
The City had no right to flood Plaintiffs property. Plaintiff is entitled to 
this Court's Order enjoining the City from wrongfully flooding Plaintiffs property and 
an Order of Abatement specifically allowing Plaintiff to abate future flooding and seek 
damages for that abatement i?om the Defendant. 
POINT FOUR 
PLAINTIFF MAKE NO RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR CLAIM 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is trying to hold Defendant liable under a 
theory of respondeat superior, attempt to hold the city liable for the conduct of its 
employees or independent contractors. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment, pp. 13-14. 
Plaintiff has not alleged any respondeat superior - or employment of a tort 
feasor. Defendant has not pointed to any pleading or fact in summary judgment for such 
an argument. 
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To the contrary, it is the Ci@'s own official action, as outlined by the 
Defendant own filings and official action that is the source of the inverse condemnation. 
Defendant admits in its own "Statement of Facts" its own actions: 
The Pocatello Creek Road reconstruction project was 
identified as a critical transportation need by ... the Ci@ of 
Pocatello in the late 1990's ... See, AfJidavit Turner, 73... 
The City of Pocatello alloted funds for an engineering 
consulting firm to be hired to create the plan and design 
specifications for the project ... After the City of Pocatello had 
received the final plans and specifications from Rocky 
Mountain Engineering, it authorized the Mayor to move 
forward with ... See, Affidavit Turner, 77 ... 
When the plan and specifications were completed for 
the Pocatello Creek Road project, the City of Pocatello, as 
sponsor, entered an agreement with the State of Idaho 
Department of Transportation ... for the administration of the 
Pocatello Creek project on August 15,2003. See, Affidavit 
Turner, 75. The Pocatello Ci@ Councilpassed Resolution 
No. 2003-13 on August 7,2003, which gave author@ for the 
Mayor to enter the "Stat~ocalAgreement" with the State 
of Idaho. See, Affidavit Turner, 16 ... 
- Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment, pp. 2-3 (citing Defendant's own filed Affidavit of 
Lindell Turner. 
This was the City's action. It can blame no one else. 
It is clear in Monell, a case cited by Defendant, that municipal corporations 
and similar governmental entities are "persons," under Section 1983. Monell v. New 
Vork CMy Dept. of SucPaIS~~ices, 438 U.S. 658,663 (1978). 
Plaintiff is not seeking to hold Defendant liable under respondeat superior 
and there is not a single fact to support such an argument. 
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Defendant has not established - or even alleged - the failing of any 
subcontractor, and Plaintiff has neither. It is the City's official action that is the issue. 
POINT FIVE 
THE CITY HAS NO IMMUNITY 
FOR INVERSE CONDEMNATION - AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The City argues - without supporting authority - that the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act supercedes the Idaho Constitution or United States Constitution, and 42 
U.S.C. $ 1983, and provides immunity even for constitutional violations. Defendant% 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 15. Besides the fact that statutes 
do not overrule the Constitution or federal rights, in fact, there is no immunity. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has already taken a clear position as to 
Defendant's - citeless - attempt to claim immunity for inverse condemnation: 
This provision of the Constitution [Idaho Const. Art. I, $ 141, 
therefore, waives the immuni@ of the State from suit, and if 
the State takes the property without condemning, the 
landowner, to give full force and effect to the provision of the 
Constitution as self-executing, must be entitled to sue therefor 
and such are the universal holdings of the courts which have 
had occasion to consider this specific point; i.e., where the 
State has taken private property for public use without paying 
for it, and tries to avoid paying by claiming immunity. 
* * * 
In the administration of constitutional guaranties, the State 
cannot afford to be other than square andgenerous. To 
deprive the citizen of his property by other than legal 
processes and depend on escape h m  the consequences under 
cover of the plea of nonsuability of the State is too 
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anomalous and out of step with the spirit and letter of the 
law to claim protection under the Constitution. 
- Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170,178,213 P.2d 911 (1950). 
Likewise, Plaintiffs United States Constitutional claim (and $ 1983 claim) 
are not claims from which the City is immune: 
"Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is 
wrongful under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 or $ 1985(3) cannot be 
immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute 
which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling 
effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory 
promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution 
insures that the proper construction may be enforced." 
Howlett v. Rosq 496 U.S. 356, 376-377 (U.S. 1990) 
A "landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as a 
result of 'the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to 
compensation . . . .' Unitedstates v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253,257 (1980), quoting 6 P. 
Nichols, Eminent Domain § 25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972). As noted in JUSTICE 
BRENNAN's dissent in Sun Diego Gas & Electric Co., 450 U.S., at 654-655, it has been 
established, at least since Jacobs v. UnitedStates, 290 U.S. 13 (1933), that claims for just 
compensation are grounded in the Cianstitution itself: 
'The suits were based on the right to recover just 
compensation for property taken by the United States for 
public use in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. 
That rkht wasguaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that 
condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the 
right was asserted in suits by the owners did not change the 
essential nature of the claim. The form of the remedy did not 
qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth Amendment. 
Statutory recognition was not necessary. A promise to pay 
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was not necessary. Such a promise was implied because of 
the duty to pay imposed by the Amendment. The suits were 
thus founded upon the Constitution of the United States." Id., 
at 16. (Emphasis added.) 
- Fimt Engllsh Evangelltcal Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304,315 (1987) 
"Congress has not evinced any intention to defer to the states the definition 
of the federal right created in section 1983, or to adopt the states' remedies or procedures 
for the vindication of that right. * * * Indeed, the history of section 1983, summarized in 
Monroe v. Pape, supra, 365 U.S. 167, 8 1 S. Ct. 473,5 L. Ed. 2d 492, vividly 
demonstrates that state concepts of sovereign immunily were alien to the purposes to be 
served by the Civil Rights Act. (See also, Beauregard v. Wingard (S.D.Ca1.1964) 230 F. 
Supp. 167, 173.) An incorporation of such state-created policies "would practically 
constitute a judicial repeal of the C M  Rights Act." ( Hofian v. Halden (9th Cir. 1959) 
268 F.2d 280,300; Jobson v. Henne (2d Cir. 1966) 355 F.2d 129.) Donovan v. 
Reinboldl 433 F.2d 738,742 (9th Cir. 1970). 
The City has no "Idaho Tort Claims Act" immunity for the Constitutional 
and federal claims. 
POINT SIX 
THE CITY HAS TAKEN PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY 
IN VIOLATION OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION 
Defendant claims that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a "taking" under 
the Idaho Constitution and therefore "has failed to establish that there is no genuine issue 
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as to any material fact on her motion for summary judgment with regard to the issue of 
inverse condemnation." Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment, p. 47. AS to the Idaho Constitutional claim, Defendant only takes issue with 
respect to the issue of a "taking." Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment, p. 218. 
The Idaho Constitution states: "Private property may be taken for public 
use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, 
shall be paid therefor." ldaho Const. Art. I, g 14 (2008). 
Plaintiffs Property Was "Taken" 
Defendant claims that Plaintiff has no claim unless Plaintiffs property was 
"taken." Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 18. 
Defendant claims "mere interruption of the use of one's property, as it is less than a 
permanent (complete) deprivation, does not mandate compensation." Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 18. Defendant overstates the law 
of "taking." 
Defendant relies on two cases: Covington v. JeffePson County, 137 Idaho 
777,53 P.3d 828 (2002); and Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536,96 
P.3d 637 (2004). However, neither is similar to the facts of this case and neither is a 
direct-impact case. Covington involved "increased traffic in the area, increased noises, 
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offensive odors, dust, flies and litter" and Moon was 'a field burning "smoke" case as set 
forth below. 
Moon cites to Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170,213 P.2d 91 1 (1950) as 
good authority on flooding. Renninger does not support the City. To the contrary, 
Renninger speciJically supports a temporary flooding as cornpensable. 
Defendant's Cases Are Ina~~l icable  -Thev Do Not Deal With Loss of Use 
In Covington, 
"The Covingtons contend a taking has occurred because the 
operation of the landfill has caused increased traffic in the 
area, increased noises, offensive odors, dust, flies and fitter. 
However, there has been no loss of access to or denial of any 
use of the Covingtons' property." CovIngton v. Jemm 
Cmnty, I 3 7  ldaho 777,782'53 P.3d 828 (2002). 
In Moon, the Court cited to Covington stating: 
The taking asserted by the plaintiffs is not a physical taking 
because the plaintiffs' land is not appropriated and because the 
smoke complained of does not result in a loss of access or of 
any complete use of the property. See Hughes v. State of 
Idaho, 80 Idaho 286,328 P.2d 397 (1958) (impairment of a 
right of access constituted a 'taking of property'). See also 
Covington, supra (where there has been no loss of access to 
or denial of any use of the Covingtons'property). Moon v. N. 
Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 ldaho 536,542'96 P.3d 637 
(2004). 
In Covington and Moon, because there had been no loss of access or use 
there was no "taking." 
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Plaintiff in this case, however, has specificallly alleged the requisite loss of 
14. As a direct and proximate cause of the Defendant City of 
Pocatello's negligence and failings as set forth herein, the 
Plaintiff has been specially and generally damaged in her 
home and property, cleaning and repair expense, replacement 
expense, resultant mold and loss of use and beneJit of her 
home and other damages incidental to all of the foregoing. 
- Complaint and Jury Demand, Ti 14. 
Additionally, Plaintiff has demonstrated the factual basis for the loss of use 
and access to her home and for residential purposes: 
Plaintiffs home initially flooded February 28,2006; when 
she came home from work at the PMC to find her "basement 
was entirely covered in water" from "three inches deep" to "a 
half inch deep." Linda Brown Deposition 8:11-24; Affidavit 
of Linda Brown, Till.  
* * *  
Plaintiff went in the back yard and saw that the "landscaping 
in the backyard had been eroded away and there was a lot of 
silt and dirt" washed from the upper garden area onto the 
lawn, and "the water had come across the lawn and into the 
house." Linda Brown Deposition 10:s-15; Affldavit of Linda 
Brown, 111 1. 
* * * 
This February 28,2006 flood caused "water damage" in the 
"whole basement." Linda Brown Deposition 45:2146:8. 
* * * 
Plaintiff contacted Service Master and "They sent a team in with high-powered vacuum 
furniture, everything that was in the basement was moved up to the family room. All the 
carpets were pulled, the padding was destroyed, and the carpets were re-laid back down 
on the floor to dry to see if they could be salvaged. They brought in big fans and heating 
units to dry out the entire basement." Linda Brown Deposition 11:5-13. 
* * * 
Plaintiff had other contractors come in to respond to the 
damage. The "carpet was not salvageable in the bedroom so 
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it was replaced by Rug Rat Floor Covering." Linda Brown 
Deposition 11:116-21; Affidavit of Linda Brown, n15. 
* * *  
Since that first flood, Plaintiff experienced frequent and 
inevitable flooding. Affidavit of Linda Brown, n16. 
* * * 
On December 27,2006, there was another "rainstorm" and 
"The water flowed down Pocatello Creek Road into" 
Plaintiffs "yard, across the lawn" and the trenches "filled in 
with dii, silt, water, ice, and the water again came into the 
house." Linda Brown Deposition 18:24-1E4; Affldavit of 
Linda Brown, n22. 
* * * 
Plaintiffs suffered damage "to the walls, specifically this 
time you could see the rust marks from the water near the 
mop boards. The carpet was again damaged. The tile in the 
bathroom had been damaged at this point in time." Soon 
after Plaintiff "began to see mold growing" around the 
window." Linda Brown Deposition 18:2-11; Affidavit of 
Linda Brown, n24. 
* * * 
The prior so-called fix was inadequate; Plaintiff continued to 
see water running down her "landscaping towards" her house 
"every time it rained." Linda Brown Deposition 23:ll-13; 
Affidavit of Linda Brown, B25. 
* * *  
Sandba~s Are Not a Solution 
On February 5,2007, The City of Pocatello placed sandbags 
on Pocatello Creek Road. Answer to Interrogatory No. 7 
(See Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit C, p 4,s). 
After being placed on notice of the water run-off, the City of 
Pocatello "admits that sandbags were placed as a temporary 
remedy to water run-off." Answer to Request for Admission 
No. 6 (See Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit B, p. 3). 
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Admitted Inadeauate Remedy 
The City of Pocatello a h i t s  that "Defendant through its agents has 
previously acknowledged that the placement of sandbags on Pocatello Creek Road was 
not intended to be nor is it an appropriate permanent remedy of the runoff water 
problem for the Pocatelfo Creek Road modc~cation." Answer to Request for 
Admission No. 28 (See Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit 8, p. 3). The City's admission of a 
"not intended to be nor is it an appropriate permanent remedy" admits that otherwise this 
flooding was a permanent problem. 
The Case on Point is Rennin~er 
Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170,213 P.2d 911 (1950) is good law as 
evidenced by its citation in Plaintiffs cited case: Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 
140 Idaho 536,542,96 P.3d 637 (2004). 
In Renninger the Plaintiffs owned certain real estate in Latah County used 
as a recreation park, dance hall, cafe and home." As to Plaintiffs' property: 
"The Highway No. 95 is a public highway crossing the 
Palouse River on adjacent land. In 1946 and 1947, the 
Department of Public Works constructed a concrete bridge 
with approaches across the Palouse River, replacing an old 
bridge, and in so doing the highway was raised in grade and 
the same acted as a dam partially obstructing the natural 
flow of the river, causing it to overflow lands owned by the 
plaintiffs during high water dnd freshet stages. 
The bridge is so constructed that theplaintiffsr 
property has been overflowed for a period of several days 
and theflooding ofplaintc&'fsrproperty by the overflow from 
the Palouse River has, according to the complaint, rendered 
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the property unfit for recreational purposes and has 
rendered the residence, cafe and other buildings untenable 
during certain periods of the year. 
- Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170,213 P.2d 911 (1950) 
The Renninger Court found a "taking" based upon these facts of Plaintiffs 
property being "overflowedfor aperiod of several days" which has "rendered the 
residence, ... untenable during certain periods of the year." 
The Renninger Court noted the absurd result that would follow if the 
takings clause were interpreted and applied as Defendant argued; no "absolute 
conversion" is required for their to be a compensable Constitutional "taking": 
"It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in 
construing a provision of constitutional law, always 
understood to have been adopted for protection and security 
to the rights of the individual as against the government, and 
which has received the commendation of jurists, statesmen 
and commentators as placing the just principles of the 
common law on that subject beyond the power of ordinary 
legislation to change or control them, it shall be held that if 
the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real 
property to the uses of the public it can destroy its value 
entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any 
extent; can, in effect, airbject it to total destruction without 
making any compensation, because in the narrowest sense of 
that word, it is not taken for the public use. Such a 
construction wouldpervert the constitutionalprovision into 
a restriction upon the rights of the citizen, as those rights 
stood at the common law, instead of the government, and 
make it an authority for invasion of private right under the 
pretext of the public good, which had no warrant in the laws 
or practices of our ancestors." 
* * *  
"But there are numerous authorities to sustain the doctrine 
that a serious interruption to the common and necessary 
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use ofproperty may be, in the language of Mr. Angell, in his 
work on water-courses, equivalent to the W i g  of it, and that 
under the constitutional provisions it is not necessary that the 
land should be absolutely taken. * * * As it is the 
Constitution of that State that we are called on to construe, 
these decisions of her Supreme Court, that overflowing land 
by means of a dam across a stream is taking private 
property, within the meaning of that instrument, are of 
special weight if not conclusive on us. 
* * *  
But we are of opinion that the decisions referred to have gone 
to the uttermost limit of sound judicial construction in favor 
of this principle, and, in some cases, beyond it, and that it 
remains true that where real estate is actually invaded by 
superinduced additions of water, earth, sand or other material, 
or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to 
effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, 
w a i n  the meaning of the Constitution, and that this 
proposition is not in conflict with the weight of judicial 
authority in this country, and certainly not with sound 
principle. Beyond this we do not go, and this case calls us to 
go no further." 
- Renninger v. State, 70 ldaho 170,213 P.2d 911 (1950) 
(citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay d ~Wississippi Canal Co., 13 
Wall. 166,80 U.S. 166, 20 L.Ed. 557 at pages 560-561). 
The Renniager Court noted that the Pumpelly case "has been followed 
approving the doctrine that the government cannot, by abstaining from absolute 
conversion of property, inflict permanent and irreparable injury on it without making 
any compensation, under aplea that it is not "taken" for the public use." Renninger v. 
State, 70 ldaho 170,213 P.2d 911 (1950). 
That is exactly what Defendant attempts in this case, and attempting "by 
abstaining from absolute conversion of property," to "inflict permanent and irreparable 
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injury on it without making any compensation, under aplea that it is not 'taken' for the 
public use." 
The Court should find a taking as set forth by the doctrine in Renninger: a 
"taking" based upon the fact that the recurrent flooding caused by Plaintiffs action has 
caused flooding of Plaintiffs residence for greater than theGperiod of several days" in 
Renninger which flooding has "rendered [Plaintiffs] residence, ... untenable during 
certain periods of the year." 
Plaintiff's "Takinp" Damages Reauire Her Remediation 
The prior briefing itemized the "taking" damages which required repair. 
The are also set forth in affidavit and deposition testimony. Affidavit of Linda Brown, 
nn32-40; Linda Brown Deposition 27:4-Q 28:4-6; 424-9; 50:20-23; 53:20-24; 
POINT SEVEN 
THE CITY HAS TAKEN PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY 
IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not suffered a taking under the 
United States Constitution. In this case, Plaintiff has been subjected to recurring 
flooding, put the City on notice of that and failed to remedy the problem - forcing this 
lawsuit. Plaintiff has properly set forth a taking. 
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United States Constitution 
The United States Constitution prohibits the taking of "private prope rty... 
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. ConstStution, AmendmentV (Takings 
Clause). 
"42 U.S.C. $ 1983 creates a remedy for violations of federal rights 
committed by persons acting under color of state law. State courts as well as federal 
courts have jurisdiction over $ 1983 cases." Howlett v. Rose, 496 u.S. 356,358 (1990). 
Violation of a person's constitutional rights "would serve as a basis for a $ 
1983 claim." Accredited Home Lenders, lnc. v. City of SeattIe, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
48135 (W.D. Wash. July 2,2007). 
The Citv's Tort Theorv Fails - This is Recurrent Flooding 
Defendant focuses on an inapplicable line of cases discussing a tort versus 
taking analysis - failing to cite a single controlling U.S. Supreme Court case. Defendant 
has even failed to provide the criterion for determining whether to apply this tort-verses- 
taking analysis. 
The tort-versus-taking analysis applies only to where there is not inevitably 
recurring flooding: 
the critical element of an inverse condemnation taking in a 
flooding case is that of inevitable recurringfloods. Bartz v. 
Unitedstates, 224 Ct. C1. 583,593,633 F.2d 571,577 
(1980). Government-induced flooding must be inevitable and 
recurring to constitute a compensable taking, otherwise it is 
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merely consequential injury or a tort which, in such instances, 
recovery is not authorized in this court." 
Sihg/efon f i  United States 6 CI. Ct. 154 I62 (CI. Ct. 1983) 
(single flooding incident after a dam overflowed 
subsequent to a hundred year flood). 
The tort-versus-taking analysis argued by Defendant is clearly not 
applicable here, where subsequent to the road constmction, Plaintiff has experienced 
frequent and inevitable flooding. Affidavit of Counsel, q16. This includes flooding after 
December 27,2006 where "it kept flooding continually from then on" and through 
"March of 2007." Linda Brown Deposition 933-14; 110:8-12 (Exhibit A, Affidavit of 
Counsel (6-30-069). 
This is an undisputed and unrefuted fact. 
The Citv Effectuated a bbTakinp'9 Under the United States' Constitution 
The Defendant also set forth law regarding categorical and non-categorical 
takings, arguing that this is merely a "non-categorical" taking, as opposed to a 
"categorical" taking. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, 
pp. 20.21. This "red-herring" argument merely looks at whether there is aper se 
categorical taking, or whether there must be a factual determination of a taking. See, 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, pp. 20. 
The City Provides An Improper Analvsis of Inverse Condemation 
The City then claims that "plaintiff has not even cited the proper analysis 
for an inverse condemnation case under the Fifth Arnend"ment" in reference to the City's 
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attempt to have a "tort" analysis. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment, pp. 22. The City; however, is who has failed to provide "proper analysis." 
The elements are simply this: 
Consideration of the compensation question must begin with 
direct reference to the language of the FiRh Amendment, 
which provides in relevant part that 'private property [shall 
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.' As 
its language indicates, and as the Court has eequently noted, 
this provision does not prohibit the taking of private property, 
but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power. 
See Williamson County, 473 U.S., at 194; Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264,297, 
n. 40 (1981); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932); 
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United Sdafes, 148 U.S. 3 12, 
336 (1893); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513,518 (1883). 
This basic understanding of the Amendment makes clear that 
it is designed not to limit the governmental interference with 
property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in 
the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a 
taking. Thus, government action that works a taking of 
property rights necessarily implicates the "constitutional 
obligation to pay just compensation." Amstrong v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). 
- First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of 
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,314-315 (U.S. 1987). 
The elements are therefore, was there a "government action that works a 
taking of property rights" that "necessarily implicates the 'constitutional obligation to pay 
just compensation. "' 
In this case there was. There is unrefuted frequent and inevitable flooding. 
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Plaintiff Has Stated a Proper Claim for a Taking 
The U.S. Supreme Court law is clear - Plaintiff s claim is for a taking 
under the United States Supreme Court case, Unitedstates v. Cress, 243 U.S. 3 16,329 
(U.S. 1917): 
"Where the government by the construction of a dam or other 
public works so floods lands belonging to an individual as to 
substantially destroy their value there is a taking within the 
scope of the Fifth Amendment. While the government does 
not directly proceed to appropriate the title, yet it takes away 
the use and vahe; when that is done it is of little 
consequence in whom the fee may be vested. Of course, it 
results from this that the proceeding must be regarded as an 
actual appropriation of the land, including the possession, the 
right of possession and the fee; and when the amount awarded 
as compensation is paid the title, the fee, with whatever rights 
may attach thereto -- in this case those at least which belong 
to a riparian proprietor -- pass to the government and it 
becomes henceforth the owner." There is no diference of 
k i ~ d ,  but only of degree, between apermanent condition of 
continual overflow by back-water and apermanent liabiliq 
to intermittent but inevitably recurring overflows; and, on 
principle, the right to compensation must arise in the one case 
as in the other. If any substantial enjoyment of the land still 
remains to the owner, it may be treated as a partial instead of 
a total divesting of his property in the land. The taking by 
condemnation of an interest less than the fee is familiar in the 
law of eminent domain. Where formal proceedings are 
initiated by the party condemning, it is usual and proper to 
specify the precise interest taken, where less than the fee. But 
where, as in this case, the property-owner resorts to the courts, 
as he may, to recover compensation for what actually has 
been taken, upon theprinciple that the Government by the 
very act of taking impliedly has promised to make 
compensation because the dictates ofjccstice and the terms 
of the FiBh Amendment so require ( United States v. Great 
Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645,656; United States v. Lynah, 
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188 U.S. 445,465), and it appears that less than the whole has 
been taken and is to be paid for, such a right or interest will be 
deemed to pass as is necessary fairly to effectuate the purpose 
of the taking; 
- United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316,329 (US. 1917) 
The Idaho Su~reme Court's Renninger Decision Conforms 
Similar to Cress, the Idaho Supreme Court likewise found a taking on 
similar facts where the government in constructing a bridge "raised the grade" causing the 
river "to overflow lands owned by the plaintiffs during high water and freshet stages." 
and "The bridge is so constructed that theplaintiffsf property has been overflowed for a 
period of several days and theflooding ofplaintiffs1proper& by the overflow from the 
Palouse River has, according to the complaint, ... rendered the residence ... untenable 
during certain periods of the year." Rennfnger v. State, 70 Idaho 170,172,213 P.2d 
.The City Must Compensate for the Time Taken 
The City also argues that because it finally (after the filing of this lawsuit) 
attempted a remedy, that Plaintiffs claim is not "permanent" and therefore not 
compensable. Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition to Summary Judgment, pp. f9. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that temporary takings are still 
takings: 
"We merely hold that where the government's activities have 
already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent 
action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide 
compensation for the period during which the taking was 
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effective. Fitst English Evangeliical Lutheran Church v. 
Counfy of LOS Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,321 (U.S. 1987). 
The finding of a taking is a matter of law for this Court. City of Lew/ston 
v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 856,853 P.2d 596 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993). Plaintiff requests 
this Court's finding of a eompensable taking. 
POINT EIGHT 
CERTAIN DAMAGES ARE UNDISPUTED 
Finally, Plaintiff has set forth, and Defendant has failed to refule any of the 
following damages, which Plaintiff requests the Court award given the absence of any 
genuine issue of material fact: 
Plaintiff has suffered additional damages including the damage to the value 
Service Master Cleaning 
and Restoration 
Rug Rat Floor Covering 
Basement Repair 
Best Clean Care 
Summit Environmental 
John's Paint & Glass 
Edged in Stone 
TOTAL 
of her home caused by the flooding and mold, and loss of use of the lower portion of her 
home for the three months of February into May 2006, and eleven months from 
$3,223.80 
$3,445.31 
$2,300.05 
$6,883.25 
$3,322.58 
$654.04 
$5,457.00 
$25,286.03 
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Affidavit of Linda Brown, n 33, Exhibit B 
Affidavit of Linda Brown, n 34, Exhibit C 
Affidavit of Linda Brown, q35, ~xhib i t  A, D 
Affidavit of Linda Brown, q36, Exhibit E 
Affidavit of Linda Brown, n 37, Exhibit F 
Affidavit of Linda Brown, 7 38, Exhibit G 
Affidavit of Linda Brown, 11 39, Exhibit H 
December 2006 through November 2007. Affidavit of Linda Brown, n40. The value of 
this will be a jury question. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs home and yard were seriously damaged because the City was 
indifferent to adequate roadway water run off. The City was indifferent to adequate 
repair. The City was indifferent to the undisputed fact that the problem came into being 
only with the 2005 roadway work. 
Plaintiff should not have had to file suit to get a meaningful remedy and fair 
compensation. The City has been indifferent to the law and the facts. 
Plaintiff has demonstrated a compensable tort claim and violations of the 
Idaho and United States Constitution. Summary Judgment should be granted in favor of 
Plaintiff as to the unrefuted damages. 
D A E D  this 21" day of July, 2008 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 21%' day of July, 2008 I faxed a copy of the foregoing to 
Blake G. Hall and Sam L. Angel1 of Anderson, Nelson, Hall & Smith, P.A., 490 
Memorial Drive, Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630, Fax 523-7254, and that a courtesy copy has 
been hand-delivered to the Honorable David C .  Nye at his chambers at the Bannock 
County Courthouse. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
LINDA BROWN, 
) Case No. CV-2007-3303-OC 
Plaintiff 
) 
vs. 1 DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a Municipal ) 
Corporation, 1 
Defendant. 1 
This matter came before the Court on July 28,2007, for oral argument on Plaintiffs Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Appearing on 
behalf of the Plaintiff, Linda Brown, was Ryan Lewis. Appearing on behalf of the Defendant, City 
of Pocatello, was Sam Angell. At the hearing the Court heard oral argument from all parties and 
took the matters under advisement. The Court now issues its decisions. The Court denies 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and grants Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
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FACTS 
Plaintiff, L i  Brown, is a resident of Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho, residing at 2300 
Darrell Loop where she has lived since April of 2001. Her back yard is adjacent to Pocatello Creek 
Road. Defendant, City of Pocatello, is a Municipal Corporation located in Bannock County, 
incorporated under the laws of the State of Idaho and having responsibility for the roadway system. 
The portion of Pocatello Creek Road at issue is owned and maintained by the City of 
Pocatello. Plaintiff's property sits about twenty feet below Pocatello Creek Road. Plaintiffs 
basement was flooded on February 28, 2006. Plaintiff alleges that the flooding was a result of 
Defendant City of Pocatello's negligence in altering and reconstructing the Pocatello Creek Road 
roadway from its prior "water-safe" condition so as to create, among other things a new roadway 
depression and water run-off pattern than had previously existed. 
Plaintiff states that prior to the summer of 2005 she had never had any water or water runoff 
damage to her property from water or rain on Pocatello Creek Road, nor had the prior home owners. 
In the summer of 2005 Defendant undertook construction on the Pocatello Creek Road behind 
Plaintiff's home. Plaintiff states that in so doing, Defendant negligently altered and reconstructed 
the roadway. Plaintiff alleges that the madway as reconstructed allowed roadway water to pool on 
and adjacent to the roadway as there was no adequate means to properly and sately divert water 
without it passing onto Plaintiffs property. 
Plaintiff states that as a result of the Pocatello Creek Road reconstruction, the roadway water 
flowed off Pocatello Creek Road and under Plaintiffs back yard fence carrying debris and soil and 
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rock with it into and across Plaintiffs yard and into Plaintiffs home. 
Defendant states that the Pocatello Creek Road reconstruction project was identified as a 
critical transportation need by the Bannock Planning Organization and the City of Pocatello in the 
late 1990's. The proposed project was placed on the Statewide Transportation Improvement 
Program for development as a Federal Aid project. 
The City of Pocatello allotted h d s  for an engineering consulting f i  to be hired to create 
the plan and design specifications for the project. The City of Pocatello chose Rocky Mountain 
Engineering, and a "Consulting Agreement" was executed on October 25,1999. After the City of 
Pocatello had received the final plans and specifications from Rocky Mountain Engineering, it 
authorized the Mayor to move forward with presenting the project to the State of Idaho for bidding. 
The State of Idaho administers all federally funded local road reconstruction projects. 
Throughout the design process by Rocky Mountain Engineering, periodic reviews were held 
by the City of Pocatello to ensure the plans and specifications were developed to accepted City, 
State, and Federal standards. When the plan and specifications were completed for the Pocatello 
Creek Road project, the City of Pocatello, as sponsor, entered an agreement with the State of Idaho 
Department of Transportation. That agreement is the "StateLocal Agreement" for administration 
of the Pocatello Creek Project. It is dated August 15,2003. The Pocatello City Council passed 
Resolution No. 2003-13 on August 7,2003, which gave authority for the Mayor to enter the 
"StateLocal Agreement" with the State of Idaho. Ultimately, the City of Pocatello, through the 
State of Idaho Department of Transportation, contracted with Jack B. Parsons Companies to modify 
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and re-pave the section of Pocatello Creek Road that runs along Ms. Brown's property. 
Defendant states that though the initial claimed damages to Plaintiffs home occurred in 
February 2006, Plaintiff did not file a notice of tort claim until April 25,2006. The April 25" tort 
claim only purported to cover damages arising from the February 2006 flooding. Subsequently, 
Plaintiff alleged that her basement flooded in April 2006, October 2006 and again in the early 
winter of 2007. Plaintiff did not file a notice of tort claim with the City of Pocatello as to those 
alleged subsequent occurrences. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows that summary judgment "shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 
714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)); see also Idaho Building Contractors 
Association v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995); Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 
Idaho 745,890 P.2d 33 1 (1995). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times 
with the party moving for summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894,896-97, 155 P.3d 
695,697-98 (2007). Generally, the record is to be construed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment, with all reasonable inferences drawn in that party's favor. Id. If 
reasonable persons could reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the motion 
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must be denied. Id. However, the nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory 
assertions that an issue of material fact exists to withstand summary judgment. The nonmoving 
party's case must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence 
is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Id.; Tuttle v. Sudenga Industries, Inc., 125 Idaho 
145, 868 P.2d 473 (1994). When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial 
court as the trier of fact is entitled to determine the most probable inferences based upon the 
undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of 
conflicting inferences. Pizzuto v. State, --- P.3d ----, 2008 WL 466568 (Idaho 2008). This is 
because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. 
Jenkins v. Barsalou, 145 Idaho 202,177 P.3d 949 (2008). 
Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party, when the nonmoving 
party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case upon which that party 
bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,530-31,887 
P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994); Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102,765 P.2d 126 (1988)). The party 
opposing the summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that 
party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting IDAHO R. CIV. P. 
56(e); Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409,797 P.2d 1 17 (1990)). If the nonmoving party does not come 
fonvard as provided in the rule, then summary judgment should be entered against that party. State 
v. Shama Resources Ltd Partnership, 127 Idaho 267,270,899 P.2d 977,980 (1995). 
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DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff and Defendant each filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and those motions will 
be addressed separately. 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment requests partial summary judgment against 
Defendant on the issues of "nuisance" and "inverse condemnation." Plaintiffs Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial, however, does x~ctt set forth a cause of action for nuisance or for inverse 
condemnation. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' in order for a pleading to be sufficient. 
The only theory of liability named in Plaintiffs Complaint is negligence. Nuisance and 
inverse condemnation were raised for the first time in Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. A 
cause of action which was not originally raised in a party's pleading may not be raised and 
considered on summary judgment. Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604,613,114 P.3d 
974,983 (2005) ("A cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on 
summary judgment. . .'3 (quoting Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172,178,75 
P.3d 733,739 (2003); Coleman v. Quaker, 232 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2000); McGinest v. GTE Service 
Corp., 360 F.3d 1 103 (9th Cir. 2004). Because nuisance and inverse condemnation were not raised 
properly in Plaintiffs Complaint, they will not be considered on Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the issues of nuisance and inverse condemnation is denied. 
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2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
a. Immunity 
Based on Idaho Code and Idaho case law, a governmental entity "is subject to liability for 
money damages arising out of its negligent conduct and those of its employees acting within the 
course and scope of their employment to the extent a party would be liable pursuant to LC. § 6- 
903." D o m  Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Blac~oot, 144 Idaho 422,163 P.3d 21 1,213 (2007). A 
governmental entity may qualify for immunity, however, "under one of the exceptions to 
government liability provided in I.C. 8 6-904." Id 
The City of Pocatello states that Idaho Code 9 6-904 provides two exceptions to 
governmental liability: Sub-paragraph (7) provides an exception to governmental liability for 
conduct that arises out of the "plan or design for construction of roads," Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 
126 Idaho 454,460,886 P.2d 330,336 (1994), and sub-paragraph (1) provides an exception 
commonly known as the "discretionary function" defense. The City of Pocatello claims that it is 
entitled to immunity under both these exceptions. 
Idaho Code 6 6-904 (7): 
Idaho Code § 6-904 (7) provides immunity to decisions and actions of governmental 
entities, stating that a "governmental entity . . . shall not be liable for any claim which:" 
Arises out of a plan or dodign for construction or improvement to the 
highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where such 
plan or design is prepared in substantial wdormance with 
engineering or design standards in effect at the time of preparation of 
the plan or design or approved in advance of the construction by the 
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legislative body of the governmental entity or by some other body or 
administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give such 
approval. 
This section was amended in 1988, but prior to its amendment, subsection (7), then 
numbered subsection (8), provided immunity for a claim which: 
Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the 
highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where such 
plan or design is prepared in substantial conformance with 
engineering or design standards in effwt at the time of preparation of 
the plan or design, approved in advance of the construction . . . by the 
legislative body of the governmental entity or by some other body or 
administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give such 
approval. 
Lawton, 126 Idaho at 458-459,886 P.2d at 334-335. The 1988 amendment by the legislature added 
the word "or" and "clearly indicates that immunity is available under the provision if the 
governmental entity shows substantial conformance or advance approval." Id at 459,335. 
Therefore, as amended, in order for a governmental entity to gain immuniw under Idaho Code $6- 
904 (7) it must show that (1) a plan or design for construction or improvement existed, and that it 
was either (2) prepared in substantial conformance with existing engineering or design standards, or 
(3) approved in advance of the construction by the legislative body exercising discretion to give 
authority for such approval. Id 
Defendant has established that a plan or design for construction or improvement existed 
based on the following facts: the City of Pocatello hired Rocky Mountain Engineering to create a 
plan or design for construction work to be done on the Pocatello Creek Road. In the late 1990's, the 
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Pocatello Creek Road reconstruction project was identified as a critical transportation need by the 
Bannock Planning Organization and the City of Pocatello. The proposed project was placed on the 
Statewide Transportation Improvement Program for development as a Federal Aid project. The 
process was started to create a design and plan and begin construction.' 
Defendant further states that in anticipation of the project, the City of Pocatello entered into 
a "Professional Agreement" with Rocky Mountain Engineering to provide designs for the project.2 
Pursuant to the professional agreement, Rocky Mountain Engineering provided detailed 
specifications for the reconstruction project. These plans and specifications were reviewed by 
engineers for the City of ~ocatello.~ All plans and specifications were completed prior to beginning 
construction on the Pocatello Creek Road project. In fact, the plans were completed before the 
project was submitted to the State of Idaho for administration of the contract. 
To comply with the requirements for immunity under Idaho Code $6-904 (7), The City of 
Pocatello needs to prove only one of the second or third elements. However, the City of Pocatello 
has submitted evidence supporting both the second and third elements. 
With regard to the second elem~nt, the City of Pocatello assured that the plans and 
specifications were "prepared in substantial conformance with existing engineering or design 
standards." City of Pocatello states that Rocky Mountain Engineering is a reputable engineering 
firm and that Rocky Mountain Engineering created the design plans and specifications in 
see, '  Affidavit of Turner, 7 3. 
See, Affidavit of Turner, 7 4. 
See, Affidavit of Turner, 10. 
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accordance with American Association of State Highway and ~rans~ortation ~ f f ~ c i a l s . ~  The plans 
were reviewed by licensed engineers for the City of Pocatello, and were found to be in compliance 
with generally recognized engineering and design  standard^.^ These actions on the part of the City 
of Pocatello ensured that the design and plan for the Pocatello Creek Road project would be carried 
out in conformance with industry standards. 
With regard to the third element, the City of Pocatello states that prior approval for the 
Pocatello Creek Road project was given by the Pocatello City Council, which is the local legislative 
body. The procedure for approval was as follows: The City of Pocatello outlined a general plan for 
reconstruction of a section of the road, in this case, Pocatello Creek Road. The City submitted its 
preliminary plan to the state of Idaho Transportation Department and entered into an agreement- 
"StateKocal Agreement (Construction) STP-7161 (loo)." In so doing, the City turned over 
supervision of the Pocatello Creek Road project to the State of Idaho Department of Transportation, 
but retained certain rights and obligations as outlined in the agreement. 
The Pocatello City Council passed Resolution No. 2003-13 on August 7,2003, which gave 
authority for the Mayor to enter the "StateKocal Agreement" with the State of ~ d a h o . ~  Prior to the 
passage of Resolution No. 2003-13, the City of Pocatello had received the final plans and 
specifications &om Rocky Mountain Engineering. Resolution No. 2003-13 authorized the Mayor to 
Id. 
See, Affidavit of Turner, f 11. 
See, Affidavit of Turner, f j  6. 
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move forward with presenting the project to the State of Idaho for bidding.' 
By hiring a reputable engineering fm to create a design and plan, and the reviewing that 
plan and presenting the Pocatello Creek Road project to the Pocatello City Council for approval, the 
City of Pocatello did everything required for prior approval by the local legislative body. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's claims of governmental immunity under Idaho Code $6- 
904 (7) are invalid because although Defendant states that there was a plan, Defendant has no 
evidence to show that this plan was actually followed. The requirement for governmental immunity 
set forth by the legislature in Idaho Code 6-904 (7), however, requires only that the governmental 
entity show that (1) a plan or design for construction or improvement existed, and that it was either 
(2) prepared in substantial conformance with existing engineering or design standards, or (3) 
approved in advance of the construction by the legislative body exercising discretion to give 
authority for such approval. Idaho Code does not require that the governmental immunity prove 
that the plan was followed. Absent any IegisIative mandate or case law establishing that a plan be 
followed, this Court will not impose any such requirement on governmental immunity. 
The City of Pocatello has provided evidence that (1) a plan or design for construction on the 
Pocatello Creek Road existed, (2) that it was prepared in substantial conformance with existing 
engineering or design standards, and that (3) it was approved in advance of the construction by the 
legislative body exercising discretion to give authority for such approval. For these reasons this 
Court finds that the City of Pocatello is entitled to governmental immunity for the Pocatello Creek 
See, Affidavit of Turner, f/ 7 
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Road construction based on Idaho Code section 6-904 (7). 
Idaho Code 6 6-904 (1). Discretionary Function: 
Idaho Code 8 6-904 (I) provides immunity to decisions and actions of governmental entities 
which: 
Arisen out of any act or omission of an employee of the 
governmental entity exercising ordinary care, in reliance upon or the 
execution or performance of a statutory or regulatory function, 
whether or not the statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the 
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty on the part of a gove&nental entity or 
employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused. 
The City of Pocatello states that it is entitled to immunity under this discretionary function 
defense because the City of Pocatello's decision to make improvements to Pocatello Creek Road 
was a decision involving the "fmancial, political, economic, and social" aspects of the community. 
Dorea Enterprises, 163 P.3d at 214. 
In another case determining whether LC. 8 6-904 (7) or 4 6-904 (1) applied, the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated: 
[Elither provision might apply in this case depending upon whether. 
. . the City failed to formulate a plan or design. As we stated in 
Bingham v. Idaho Dep 't of Tranp., "the plan or design of a highway 
is not immune from liability under Sub-section (I)." 
Lawton, 126 Idaho at 460,886 P.2d at 336 (citing Bingham v. Idaho Dep 't of Tramp., 1 17 Idaho 
147, 149,786 P.2d 538,540 (1989)). The Court went on to state that if a plan did exist, the question 
would be whether the plan substantially conformed to existing design standards or whether it 
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received advance approval, moving the determination to the factors under LC. $6-904 (7). The 
Court then stated that if there were no plan or design in existence, then LC. $ 6-904 (1) would be 
applied in determining whether the City was entitled to immunity. Id. 
In this case, a plan or design was in existence, and this Court has found that the plan or 
design did substantially conform to existing design standards and that it received advance approval, 
granting governmental immunity under LC. $6-904 (7). Because a plan or design was in existence 
and governmental immunity was granted under LC. $6-904 (7), LC. $6-904 (1) need not be applied, 
and in fact would not apply because "the plan or design of a high way is not immune from liability 
under Sub-section (I)." Id. The City of Pocatello does not have governmental immunity under LC. 
$ 6-904 (1). 
b. Idaho Tort Claims Act 
Whether Notice Was Adequate: 
Defendant has raised the issue of whether Plaintiff was on notice of the flooding. Because 
this Court has found that the Plaintiff has governmental immunity under $ 6-904 (7), it will not 
reach the issue of notice. 
Acts of Independent Contractor: 
The City of Pocatello states that it is not liable for operational error in constructing the 
roadway which allegedly caused plaintiffs damages, because such operational errors, if any, were 
committed by Jack B. Parsons Companies, which was an independent contractor. 
Idaho Code $ 6-902(4) detines "employee" as: 
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[A]n officer; employee, or servant of a governmental entity, 
including elected or appointed officials, and persons acting on behalf 
of the governmental entity in any official capacity, temporarily or 
permanently in the service of the govementd entity, whether with 
or without compensation, but the term employee shall not mean a 
person or other legal entity while acting in the capacity of an 
independent contractor under contract to the governmental entity to 
which this act applies in the event of a claims. 
The Idaho Torts Claim Act only allows Plaintiff to bring claims against governmental entities or 
their employees, and independent contractors are excluded from the deftnition of employees. 
Prior to the beginning of the road reconstrzlction, and pursuant to the "State/Local 
Agreement" the State of Idaho advertised for bids and awarded a contract to the lowest responsive 
dibber, Jack B. Parsons Co. ("Parsons"). Parsons was an independent contractor.* The State of 
Idaho oversaw and administered this project-as it was a project which utilized federal funding. 
The City of PocateIIo retained a limited supervisory role, but was not involved in the day-to-day 
management of the project? Under plaintiffs general negligence theory, the City of Pocatello is 
entitled to immunity pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act because Parsons was not an "employee" 
of the City, and because a governmental entity is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor. 
Plaintiff has presented no evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact on this 
defense. 
CONCLUSION 
A cause of action which was not originally raised in a party's pleading may not be raised 
See, Affidavit of Turner 9 8 .  
I d .  
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and considered on summary judgment. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
issues of nuisance and inverse condemnation is denied because these issues were not raised in 
Plaintiffs Complaint. 
Idaho Code provides an exception to governmental liability for conduct that arises out of the 
plan or design for construction of roads. Defendant has shown that a plan or design was in 
existence as to the road reconstruction of Pocatello Creek Road, and so Defendant is immune under 
Idaho Code 8 6-904 (7). Also, Defendant, a governmental entity, is not liable for acts of an 
independent contractor, and so the City of Pocatello is immune from the actions of Jack B. Parsons 
in the road reconstruction. Because Defendant has been found to have governmental immunity, 
Plaintiff is not entitled to monetary damages or injunctive relief from Defendant. Defendant has 
shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 4,2008. 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
LINDA BROWN, I I Case No. CV-07-3303-OC 
I 
Plaintiff, I 
1 
I 
v. I 
I JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a Municipal I 
Corporation; I I 
1 
I 
Defendant. I 
This matter having come before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and the Court having entered its Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment 
granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and good cause appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs Complaint is 
dismissed with prejudice, with Plaintiff taking nothing thereunder. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL - I 
Dated this d 4 d a y  of September, 2008. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ce ify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the 
-$ following this 16 day of September 2008, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary 
postage affixed thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello. ID 83201 
Blake G. HalVSam L. Angel1 
ANDERSON NELSON HALL SMITH, P.A. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
I)d Mailing 
[I  Hand Delivery 
I1  Fax 
[ j  Overnight Mail 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL - 2 
Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852) 
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775) 
LOWELL N. HAMrKES, CHARTERED 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 235-4200 
Attorneys for Plaintzff 
IN  THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable David C. Nye 
LINDA BROWN; 1 
1 Case No. CV-2007-3303-OC 
Plaint& ) 
1 
VS. 1 MOTION FOR 
1 RECONSIDERATION 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a Municipal 1 
Corporation; 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
Plaintiff moves the Court for its Reconsideration of its prior Memorandum 
Decision and Order granting summary judgment to the City of Pocatello. This Motion is 
made on the grounds and for the reasons that a full and correct application of the law and 
allowance of all inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, as against Defendant City's motion 
for summary judgment, entitle Plaintiff to a trial on the merits and for the further reasons 
as more fully set forth in a supporting memorandum to be filed herein. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - Page 1 
Brown v. City of Pocatello 
DATED this ~ 6 ' ~  day of September, 2008 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 26' day of September 2008 I faxed and mailed a copy 
of the foregoing to Blake G. Hall and Sam L. Angel1 of Anderson, Nelson, Hall & Smith, 
P.A., 490 Memorial Drive, Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630, Fax 523-7254. 
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N. Hawkes (ISB #1852) 
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775) 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 235-4200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable David C. Nye 
LINDA BROWN; 1 
1 Case No. CV-2007-3303-OC 
Plainti& ) 
1 
VS. 
MEMORANDUM 
) SUPPORTING PI.AINTIFFvS ) 
CITY OF POCAmLLO, a Municipal ) MOTION FOR 
Corporation; 1 RECONSIDERATION 
1 
Defendant. 1 
Plaintiff has previously moved this Court pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B), 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for its reconsideration of its Decision on Motions for 
Summary Judgment denying summary judgment to Plaintiff and granting summary 
judgment to the Defendant. This Memorandum is in support of that prior Motion filing. 
Procedural Context 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was previously denied on the 
basis that the "only theory of liability named in Plaintiff's Complaint is negligence." 
Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment, p. 6. However, the law does not require 
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a cause of action or "theory of liability" to be pleaded, only that 'yacts' upon which relief 
can be granted" be provided. Rule 8 (a)(l), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Plaintiffs Complaint properly provided sufficient "facts" that, when 
applied to the law, established that Plaintiff was entitled to relief for inverse 
condemnation as required under Rule 8(a), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
caselaw interpreting Rule 8. 
Additionally, Plaintiff was entitled to "all favorable inferences" with 
respect to the Defendant City of Pocatello's Motion for Summary Judgment. Those 
inferences allow for a finding of negligence for failure to establish compliance with the 
"plan7' which was allegedly created. The Defendant cannot turn a blind eye to its own 
compliance with a plan upon which it claims immunity; at a minimum, immunity 
depends upon compliance. 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING THE NAMING 
OF A "THEORY OF LIABILITY" IN THE COMPLAINT 
The Court denied the entirety of Plaintiffs claims by a single sentence, and 
without specific citation to Plaintiffs Complaint stating that Plaintiffs Complaint "does 
not set forth a cause of action for nuisance and inverse condemnation .... The only theory 
of liabili@ named in Plaintiffs Complaint is negligence." Decision on Motions for 
' Ail bold and italics herein are added unless stated otherwise. 
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Summary Judgment, p. 6. That was error because - since 1958 - a Plaintiff is not 
required to name a "theory of liability7' or '%auses of action" in a Complaint; a Plaintiff 
need only provide facts that, when applied to the law, are a legally sufficient basis for 
recovery. Plaintiff did. 
1958 Chan~es - Removes Reauirement of "Cause of Action" 
Idaho has not required a Complaint to plead a "Cause of Action" since 
1958. Prior to 1958 the statutory IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE required "a 
statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language." 
Archer v. Shields Lumber Co., 91 Idaho 861,867,434 P.2d 79, 85 (1967) (quoting Idaho 
Code 9 5-605). "This is a dzgerent standard than what is required today by I.R.C.P. 
8(a)(l), requiring a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief." Seiniger Law Otrr?ce v. North Pacific Insurance Company, - ldaho - 
,2008 ldaho Lexis 10,11, 178 P.3d 606 (2008). The ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
were formally adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court on November 1,1958. 
No "cause of action" or '"theory of 1iabiIity" must be "named." 
No S~ecific L e ~ a l  Theory Needs to Be Named 
"Under the modern form of pleading a complaint need not state the 
speczjic legal theories upon which the plaintiff relies. A simple, concise statement of the 
operative facts is sufficient." Bauer v, Minidoka Sch. Disf., 116 ldaho 586,589,778 
P.2d 336 (1989). 
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"Theories" Need ~ o t  Be Pleaded 
'There is no requirement that a complaint include a statement of the 
various legal theories upon which the plaintiff relies.,Bauer v. Minidoka School Dist. No. 
331, 116 Idaho 586, 589,778 P.2d 336,339 (1989); Collord v. Cooley, 92 Idaho 789, 
793,45 1 P.2d 535, 539 (1969). The purpose of a complaint is to inform the defendant of 
the materialfacts upon which the plaintiff rests the action." Quinto v. Millwood Forest 
Prods., 130 ldaho 162,167,938 P.2d 189,194 (Ct. App. 1997). Plaintiffs Complaint 
fully "informed" Defendant of "the material facts." 
In Quinto, the court discussed the determined that despite the fact that 
breach of contract was not a named theory - nor was there such a requirement - the 
facts as pleaded included: 
"The complaint alleges that Quinto delivered rough lumber to 
Millwood with instructions that Millwood was to process the 
lumber into siding, that Millwood did process the wood as 
directed by Quinto, that Quinto paid [*** 151 Millwood "the 
agreed price," that Quinto instructed Millwood to load the 
lumber onto a Davis Transport Company truck and that, 
notwithstanding these instructions, Millwood loaded the 
siding onto a tmck of Point to Point Trucking, with the 
consequence that the siding has been lost to Quinto. 
Millwood did not move for a more definite statement 
of the claim prior to trial, as was its option under I.R.C.P. 
12(e), and there is no indication that Millwood complained 
that it lacked sufficient notice that Quinto was pursuing a 
breach of contract claim. In our view, the allegations of 
Quinto's complaint fairly apprise Millwood of a cause of 
action for breach of contract." 
- Quinto v. MiUwood Forest Prods., 130 ldaho 162,167, 
938 P.2d 189,194 (Ct. App. 1997). 
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In Collard, the Idaho Supreme ~burtdetermined that despite 
the fact the "Complaint never stated their parents agreed to 
create irrevocable mutual and reciprocal wills devising their 
estates to their children and that such agreement should be 
specifically enforced. It is our conclusion that such a theory is 
adequately presented by the appellants' complaint. Under the 
modern form ofpleading a complaint need not state the 
speczjic legal theories upon which the plainwf relies. A 
simple, concise statement of the operative facts is 
sufficient .... In their complaint appellants alleged the 
execution of mutual wd reciprocal wills by their parents. 
Such an allegation presents an issue as to the intent with 
which the testators executed those wills." ~ofIom'v. Coofe~ 
92 ldaho 789,793-794 (1969). 
This Court erred in requiring a "cause of action" or naming of a "theory of 
liability" in the Complaint. 
Plaintiffs Com~laint Set Forth the Material Facts for Inverse Condemnation 
Federal and State Constitution 
The United States Constitution prohibits the taking of "private prope rty... 
for public use, withoutjust compensation." U.S. Constitution, Amendment V (Takings 
Clause). 
The Idaho Constitution states: "Private property may be taken for public 
use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, 
shall be paid therefor." ldaho Const. Art. 1,s 14 (2008). 
"The United States Supreme Court has held that landowners 
are entitled to bring actions in inverse condemnation by 
virtue of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of just 
compensation for the taking of private property." First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 
482 U.S. 304,315, 107 S.Ct. 2378,2386,96 L.Ed.2d 250 
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(1987). City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 423 Idaho 851,856, 
853 P.2d 596 (Ct. App. 4993) 
With respect to the IDAHO CONSTITUTION, The Idaho Supreme Court has 
ruled that governmental interference with an owner's used or enjoyment of property 
requires compensation. The two elements that establish an inverse condemnation under 
either the Idaho or United States Constitution are: (1) Government action, and (2) Taking 
of property: 
"Constitutional jurisprudence has extended this protection for 
property owners and, in addition to an outright taking, 
governmental interfrence with an owner's use or 
enjoyment of his private property may also require 
compensation. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2892-93,120 L. Ed. 2d 798 
(1 992). As Justice Holmes opined, "while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will 
be recognized as a taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393,415,67 L. Ed. 322,43 S. Ct. 158 (1922). Ifa 
regulation of private property that amounts to a taking is later 
invalidated, this action converts the taking to a "temporary" 
one for which the government must pay the landowner for the 
value of the use of the land during that period. First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cty., 482 U.S. 
304,319,96 L. Ed. 2d 250,107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987)." 
McCuskey v. Canyon County Comm'Rs, 128 Idaho 213, 
215-216,912 P.2d 100 (1996) 
"Whether a taking has occurred in a particular case is ultimately a question 
of law. Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 670,603 P.2d at 1004." City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 
Idaho 851, 856,853 P.2d 596 (Ct. M p .  4993). 
Both of the requirements for inverse condemnation were specifically 
satisfied as the "material facts" have been provided: 
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INVERSE 
CONDEMNATION 
REQUIREMENT 
MATERIAL FACTS PLEADED IN COMPLAINT 
Government action 
Taking of  property 
3. Defendant City of Pocatello, is a Municipal Corporation 
located in Bannock County, incorporated under laws of the 
State of Idaho and having responsibility for the design and 
maintenance of the Pocatello Creek Road behiid Mrs. Brown's 
residence. 
* * * 
5. In the summer of 2005, primarily July and August, 
Defendant City of Pocatello undertook construction on the 
Pocatello Creek Road behind PlaintiffLinda Brown's home. 
In so doing the Defendant City of Pocatello negligently altered 
and reconstructed the Pocatello Creek Road roadway from its 
prior "water-safe" condition so as to create, among other 
things, a new roadway depression and water run-off pattern 
than had previously existed and that did not 
damage adjacent private properties. 
* * * 
6. .... The completed roadway from the City-County junction 
line did not flow smoothly but created a depression and 
allowed for pooling of water and water runoff into Plaintiffs 
yard and home .... 
* * * 
12. As a direct and proximate cause of the negligent Pocatello 
Creek Road reconstruction, the roadway water flowed off 
Pocatello Creek Road and under Plainties back yard fence 
carrying debris and soil and rock with it into the Plaintiff's 
yard and across the Plaintiffs yard and into Plaintiff's home 
through windows and into and down walls onto floors and 
under carpeting and into other rooms and under tile. 
14. As a direct and proximate cause of the Defendant City of 
Pocatello's negligence and failings as set forth herein, the 
Plaintiff has been specially and generally damaged in her 
home andproperty, cleaning and repair expense, replacement 
expense, resultant mold and loss of use and benefit of her 
home and other damages incidental to all of the foregoing. 
- 
Thus, Plaintiff specifically set forth the requisite factual and legal basis for 
inverse condemnation - governmental action which resulted in the taking of Plaintiffs 
property. 
Plaintiff's Complaint Sets Forth the Material Facts For Nuisance 
A nuisance is statutorily defined as: 
Areything which is injurious to health or morals, or is 
indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the 
free use ofproperty, so as to interfere with the comfortable 
enjoyment of life orproperty, or unlawfully obstructs the 
free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any 
navigable lake, or river, stream, canal, or basin, or any public 
park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance. 
- Idaho Code 0 52-1 01 
The "anything" prefatory requirement is satisfied by the actions of the Ci@ 
which were identified in paragraphs 5 and 12 of the Complaint: 
5. In the summer of 2005, primarily July and August, 
Defendant City of Pocatello undertook construction on the 
Pocatello Creek Road behind Plaintiff Linda Brown's home. 
In so doing the Defendant City of Pocatello negligently 
altered and reconstructed the Pocatello Creek Road roadway 
from its prior "water-safe" condition so as to create, among 
other things, a new roadway depression and water run-off 
pattern than had previously existed and that did not damage 
adjacent private properties. 
* * * 
12. As a direct and proximate cause of the negligent 
Pocatello Creek Road reconstruction, the roadway water 
flowed off Pocatello Creek Road and under Plaintiffs back 
yard fence carrying debris and soil and rock with it into the 
Plaintzfs yard and across the Plaintiffs yard and into 
Plaintiffs home through windows and into and down walls 
and onto jloors and under carpeting and into other rooms 
and under tile. - Complaint and Jury Demand, 77 5,12 
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The action of the City in altering this roadway is the "anything." The 
injury portion is: 
Thus, Plaintiffs Complaint more than adequately identified the material 
facts constituting nuisance and that "simple, concise statement of the operative facts is 
NUISANCE 
REQUIREMENT 
"injurious to health or 
morals, or is indecent, or 
offensive to the senses," 
[OR] which is ... an 
obstruction to the free use 
ofproperty, so as to 
interfere with the 
comfortable enjoyment of 
life or property, 
- 
sufficient." Bauer v. MEnidoka Sch. DEsP., 416 ldaho 586,589,778 P.2d 336 (1989). 
COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 
14. .... Plaintiff has been specially and generally damaged 
in her home and property, cleaning and repair expense, 
replacement expense, resultapt mold ... and other damages 
incidental to all of the foregoing. 
-Complaint and Jury Demand, n14. 
14. ... Plaintiff has been specially and generally damaged 
in her home and property, ... and loss of use and benefit of 
her home and other damages incidental to all of the 
foregoing. - Complaint and Jury Demand, n14. 
, 
The grant of summary judgment is contrary to long-established law that 
controversies should be determined on the specific facts of the case as substantial justice 
may require. The proper exercise of judicial discretion should tend to bring about a 
judgment on the merits. Bunn v. Bunn, 99 ldaho 740,711,587 P.2d 1245,1246 (1978). 
The keystone of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is liberaliq which 
kvors a final decision predicated on the merits over a dismissal based upon a technicality. 
Gerstner v. Wah. Water Power Co., 122 ldaho 673,675,837 P.2d 799,801 (4992). 
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Plaintiff's Affidavit and Deposition Provided Additional support in^ Facts 
In addition to the Complaint and Jury Demand facts setting forth inverse 
condemnation and nuisance facts, those facts have been supplied by discovery and 
Affidavit, including the fact that the City altered the roadway causing frequent and 
inevitable flooding which had never happened before: 
4. Between June 2005 through August 2005 work on 
the Pocatello Creek Road was done which ended directly 
behind my home. Linda Brown Deposition 62:21-639. The 
Defendant City of Pocatello negligently altered and 
reconstructed the Pocatello Creek Road roadway from its 
prior "water-safe" condition so as to create, among other 
things, a new roadway depression and water run-off pattern 
that had not previously existed was created and that did not 
damage adjacent private properties. 
* * * 
5. Prior to this 2005 road work/construction, neither 
my home nor yard had been flooded fkom roadway run-off 
water. Linda Brown Deposition 1212-19; 64:20-65:6. 
* * *  
6. Following the 2005 Pocatello Creek Road 
work/construction, my yard and home has been subjected to 
numerous, frequent and inevitable occasions offlooding by 
water coming off of Pocatello Creek Road and into my yard 
and home. 
- Affidavit of Linda Brown, qln 4-6. 
It is significant to recognize that is was the filing of this lawsuit that finally 
provoked the City to remedy the new flooding problem: 
7. Ultimately - but only afier I was required tofile 
this lawsuit - did the City add an asphalt-to-cement barrier 
to keep roadway water on the road shoulders and stop the 
flooding from runoff into my yard and home. 
- Affidavlt of Linda Brown, ql7. 
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Damape - Loss of Use and Otherwise Offensive 
The flooding caused "water damage" in the "whole basement." Linda 
Brown Deposition 45:21-46:8. Affidavit of Linda Brown, 712. I have experienced 
significant damages and expenses to repair and remediate the City's improper draining of 
run-off water onto my property. Among other repair-and damages, I have had to repair 
and replace wall trim, window trim, sheetrock, taping, texturing, painting, insulation, 
floor molding, window molding, carpet, and tile. Affidavit of Linda Brown, W32. 
Mold Problems 
Mold and the dangers attendant with it were also a result of the City's 
failings. Mrs. Brown was required to hire John McCasland, Best Clean Care' a specialist 
to determine and remove the mold. Linda Brown Deposition 42:4-9; Affidavit of Linda 
Brown, 736. She also hired "mold remediation experts including Bradley Harr and Mike 
Larango who prepared a pre- and post-remediation mold report." Affidavit of Linda 
Brown, 737. It cannot be reasonably disputed that mold is certainly "injurious to health 
or morals, or is indecent, or offensive to the senses," and an obstruction to the &ee use of 
the property. 
Loss of Use 
Mrs. Brown also provided evidence as to the " damage to the value of my 
home9' and "loss of use" of her home for months at a time. Affidavit of Linda Brown, 
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The Citv Was Aware of Claims - So thev Remediated the Flooding 
The City was on notice of these claims. In fact, "It took [Plaintiff slfiling 
of this lawsuit to get the City to take proper action to contain its roadway run-off water." 
Affidavit of Lindla Brown, 730. If the City truly believed that this was a mere 
"negligence" case, then they do not need to remediate because of their contended 
"immunity." 
A "Just Result" 
Rule I(a) is a constant reminder that "a just result is always the ultimate 
goal to be accomplished." Gerstner v. Wash. WaterPower Co., 122 ldaho 673,675,837 
"A 'determination' of an action within the meaning of Rule 1 
is meant to be a determination of the controversy on the 
merits - not a termination on aprocedural technicality 
which serves litigants not at all. A determination entails a 
finding of the facts and an application of the law in order to 
resolve the legal rights of the litigants who hope to resolve 
their differences in the courts. The 'liberal construction' of the 
rules required by Rule 1, while it cannot alter compliance 
which is mandatory and jurisdictional, will ordinarily preclude 
dismissal of an appeal for that which is but technical 
noncompliance. This will be especially so where no prejudice 
is shown by any delay which may have been occasioned." 
Gemtner K Wash* Waterpower Co, 122 ldaho 673,675, 
837 P.2d 799, 801 (1992)(quoting Bunn v. Bunn, 99 ldaho 
7g0, 712,587 P.2d 4245,4247 (1978). 
The order denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
reconsidered and reversed. Both the pleadings and the evidence preclude summary 
judgment. 
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POINT N O  
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
COMPLIANCE WITH ANY CLAIMED "PLAN" 
"Motions for summary judgment should be granted with caution." Parsons 
Packing, lnc. Y. Masingil, 140 ldaho 480,481,95 P.3d 631,632 (2004). If the record 
contains conflicting inferences or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, a 
summary judgment must be denied. Parsons Packing, lnc. Y. Masingil, 140 ldaho 480, 
481,95 P.3d 639, 632 (2004). 
Plaintiff was entitled to all favorable inferences with respect to the 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and on that basis, the City's Motion should 
have been denied for failure to establish compliance with the plan which was allegedly 
created. There was no evidence by the City that it had even complied with any "plan." 
Failure to comply with aplan is the same as not having a 'plan. " The City even 
asserted negligence by the constructing contractor. 
Nca Evidence of a Plan to Flood Adiacent Provertv Owners 
Further, there was no evidence presented by the City that its alleged "plan" 
called for (1)  road reconstruction to lesser standards than with the previously-existing 
roadway, or that (2) that the "plan" cdled for a diversion of roadway water so as to flood 
adjacent property owners. 
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No Evidence of Plan compliance 
Defendant through its motion and supporting affidavit never alleged that 
the plan as designed or approved was complied with. Plaintiff is entitled to a favorable 
inference that the plan as designed and approved was not designed and approved to flood 
neighboring landowners. If Defendant contends otherwise it should be required to such 
evidence. 
The reasonable inference is that the plan was not designed or approved to 
change or alter the water run-off pattern so as to divert the Pocatello Creek Road run-off 
onto landowners - rather the drain that sits across the street. 
Defendant's Motion should not have been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs Complaint was sufficient as was her evidence. This Court 
should allow all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor relative to the Defendant's 
claimed immunity and reconsider and review the Complaint and the "operative" and 
"material facts" which set forth the elements necessary to establish nuisance and inverse 
condemnation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30'h day of September, 2008 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 30" day of September, 2008 I faxed and mailed a copy 
of the foregoing to Blake G. Hall and Sam L. Angel1 of Anderson, Nelson, Hall & Smith, 
P.A., 490 Memorial Drive, Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630, Fax 523-7254. 
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BLAKE G. HALL (2434) 
SAM L. ANGELL (70 12) 
ANDERSON NELSON HALL SMITH, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Box 5 1630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1 630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TELE SlXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
LINDA BROWN, I 
1 Case No. CV-07-3303-OC 
Plaintiff, I 
I 
I 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
v. I PLAIh'TIFF'S MOTION FOR 
I RECONSIDERATION 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a Municipal I 
Corporation; I 
I 
I 
I 
Defendant. I 
COMES NOW Defendant City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, 
Blake G. Hall, and hereby files its objection to plaintiffs motion for reconsideration. This 
objection is supported by the memorandum in opposition filed herewith. 
Dated this 4 day of October, 2008. 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the 
following this day of October, 2008, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary 
postage affixed thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
[pc] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
1322 East Center 
Pocatel10,-ID 83201 
BW. HALL 
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360 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
LINDA BROWN, 1 
1 Case No. CV-2007-3303-OC 
Plaintiff 1 
VS. 
1 
1 DECISION ON MOTION FOR 
1 RECONSIDERATION 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a Municipal 1 
Corporation, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
This matter came before the Court on October 20, 2008, for oral argument on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Reconsideration. Appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff, Linda Brown, was Lowell 
Hawkes. Appearing on behalf of the Defendant, City of Pocatello, was Sam Angell. Stephanie 
Morse was the Court Reporter. At the hearing the Court heard oral argument from all parties and 
took the matter under advisement. The Court now issues its decision. The Court denies Plaintiffs 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
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DISCUSSION 
The primary issue before this Court is whether Plaintiff sufficiently pled the claims of 
nuisance and inverse condemnation in its Complaint. Rule 8(a)(l) governs general rules for 
pleading--claims for relief, and states: 
A pleadmg which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall con* (1) if the court 
be of limited jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the grounds upon 
which the court's jurisdiction depends, (2) a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for 
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the 
alternative or of several different types may be demanded. 
In their application of Rule 8(a)(l), Plaintiff and Defendant disagree as to what constitutes 
the pleading of a "claim," fulfilling the requirement of "a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Plaintiff states that 8(a)(l) requires that a Plaintiff 
"need only provide facts that, when applied to the law, are a legally sufficient basis for recovery."' 
Plaintiff M e r  states, "under the modem form of pleading a complaint need not state the specific 
legal theories upon which the plaintiff relies. A simple, concise statement of the operative facts is 
sufficient." Citing Bauer v. MinidokaSch. Disb., 116 Idaho 586,589,778 P.2d 336 (1989). In oral 
argument before this Court, Plaintiff stated that they had pled every fact for nuisance and inverse 
condemnation in the complaint, and were essentially equating "facts" with "claims." 
Defendant states that "even the most liberal reading of plaintiff's complaint cannot result in 
a finding that she stated a claim for inverse condemnation. Her claims which were literally 
Memorandum supporting Plaintiff's ~otion for Partial Summary Judgment, at 3. 
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characterized as a cause of action for negligence simply did not fairly appraise the City of PocatelIo 
of a hidden claim for inverse condemnation.'" In oral argument before this Court, Defendant stated 
that "claim" constituted not just a pleading of facts, but that a claim is some mixture of facts and 
legal theory that is sufficient to put the Defendant on notice. 
Plaintiff and Defendant have both cited to numerous cases in support of their argument as to 
what constitutes a sufficient claim, as stated in Rule 8(a)(l). Plaintiff and Defendant have, in fact, 
both cited to the 2007 Idaho Supreme Court case Siniger v. North Pac@c to support their argument 
of what constitutes a sufficiency of claim. 145 Idaho 241,178 P.3d 606 (2007). In Siniger, the 
Supreme Court of Idaho looked at the question of what constituted an adequate claim within a 
complaint. The Court came to the conclusion that a "party's pleadings should be liberally construed 
to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive resolution to the case," but M e r  stated, "[tlhe key issue in 
determining the validity of the complaint is whether the adverse party is put on notice of the claims 
brought against it." 178 P.3d at 61 1-612 (quoting Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 
416,427,95 P.3d 34,45 (2004)). 
In determining whether the defendant was put on notice, the Supreme Court looked at the 
Defendant's answer. The Supreme Court cited a prior case, Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 
where the Court had determined that a Defendant had been put on notice of a particular claim 
because "the defendant raised three separate defenses to the claim for punitive damages in its 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration, at 6. 
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amended answer." Siniger, 178 P.3d at 612 (quoting Vendelin, 95 P.3d at 45). Because the 
Defendant had raised defenses to claims in their answer, the complaint was sufficient to put the 
Defendant on notice of these claims. 
The question before this Court, then, is whether the claims raised in the complaint were 
sufficient to put the City of Pocatello on notice of the claim for nuisance and taking. Like the 
Supreme Court, this Court will look to the Defendant's answer to determine whether the Defendant 
was put on notice of the claim for nuisance and taking. 
Unlike the defendant in Vendelin, the City of Pocatello did not raise any defenses to any 
inverse condemnation or nuisance claims in its answer. Defendant City of Pocatello's response was 
in no way sufficient to demonstrate that it had been put on notice of, or was acknowledging the 
claims of inverse condemnation or nuisance. In fact, Defendant was the first to file their Motion for 
Summary Judgment. This Motion focuses solely on the claim of negligence. The f ~ s t  t h e  there is 
any indication of the Plaintiffs claims of inverse condemnation and nuisance is in Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
While the specific legal theories may not need to be stated with particularity in the 
complaint, Rule 8(a)(l) does require that the pleading set forth a claim for relief, including "a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The Supreme Court 
of Idaho has set the standard for determining whether this requirement has been met, and that is 
whether the Defendant has been put on notice. Defendant City of Pocatello was not put on notice of 
the claims of taking and nuisance in this case, due to an insufficient pleading of these claims in 
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Plaintiffs complaint, and the Motion for Reconsideration is denied as to this issue. 
The second issue raised by Plaintiff is whether the Court properly granted Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment on the basis of immunity. In raising this issue, Plaintiff did not come 
forward with any new facts or case law that would impact the Court's original decision. Instead, 
Plaintiff simply re-argues the position that the City had to comply with its "plan" in order to obtain 
immunity. As discussed in the original decision, in order for a govemmental entity to gain 
i~miunity under Idaho Code 3 6-904 (7) it must show that (1) a plan or design for construction or 
improvement existed, and that it was either (2) prepared in substantial conformance with existing 
engineering or design standards, or (3) approved in advance of the construction by the legislative 
body exercising discretion to give authority for such approval. L~wton v. City of Pocatello, 126 
Idaho 454,459,886 P.2d 330,335 (19%). There is no requirement that the City show that the work 
complied with the plan but only that the plan either substantially conformed with existing 
engineering or design standards or was approved in advance by the proper legislative body. If there 
were design issues, liability must be pursued against the engineering firm that designed the plan. If 
there were implementation or construction issues, liability must be pursued against the contractor 
that did the work or the State of Idaho that "administered" the work. However, Plaintiff has not 
even placed into the record any evidence that the plan was not followed. 
CONCLUSION 
A Plaintiffs complaint must set forth a claim for relief, sficient that a Defendant will be 
put on notice of that claim. Brown failed to adequately plead nuisance and taking in her complaint, 
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and the Defendant was not put on notice of these claims. Additionally, Plaintiff has not provided 
any additional evidence or argument sufficient to overcome the Court's original decision regarding 
immunity. The Motion for Reconsideration is therefore denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 7,2008. 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ull 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of November, 2008, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manner indicated. 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chtd. 
1322 E. Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
U.S. Mail 
( Overnight Delivery "4 ( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Fax: 235-4200 
Blake G. Hall W.S. Mail 
Sam L. Angel1 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. ( ) Hand Deliver 
P.O. Box 51630 ( ) Fax: 523-7254 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
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Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852) 
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Pocatello, ldaho 83201 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable David C. Nye 
LINDA BROWN; 
Plaintzz 
) 
) Case No. CV-2007-3303-OC 
1 
VS. 1 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a Municipal 
Corporation; 
1 
Defendant. 
0 TEE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT CITY OF POCATELLO, ITS COUNSEL, 
AND THE CLERK OF THIS COURT. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Plaintiff hereby appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Decision on 
Motions for Summary Judgment (9-4-08); Judgment of Dismissal (9-15-08); and Decision 
on Motion for Reconsideration Order (1 1-7-08) by The Honorable David C. Nye. 
2. Plaintiff has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court because the 
Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment (9-4-08); Judgment of Dismissal (9-1 5-08); 
and Decision on Motion for Reconsideration Order (1 1-7-08) by The Honorable David C. 
NOVICE OF APPEAL - Page 1 
Brown v, City of Pocatello 
Nye are final within the meaning oPRule 1 l(a)(l) Idaho Appellate Rules, pertaining to 
"judgments, orders and decrees. " 
3. Appellant's preliminary statement of issues on appeal: 
(a) The Court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
(b) The Court erred in denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
(c) The Court erred in finding nuisance and inverse condemnation 
are not pled; 
(d) The Court erred in finding immunity; and 
(e) The Court erred in denying Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
4. A Reporter's Transcript of the July 28, 2008 Motion for Summary 
Judgment hearing; October 20, 2008 Motion for Reconsideration and any other 
proceedings herein is requested, excluding nothing. 
(a) Plaintiff otherwise requests the preparation of the entire reporter's 
standard transcript as defined in Rule 25(c), I.A.R. 
(b) Plaintiff requests pursuant to Rule 26.1, Idaho Appellate Rules, 
that the reporter provide disks, or electronic media, of all transcripts. 
5. Plaintiff requests the following to be included in the Clerk's Record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 2 
Brown v. City of PocateZZo 
(a) All motion filings of the parties and the Court, including 
Memoranda and Affidavits filed relative to the respective Motions for 
Summary Judgment; 
(b) All motion filings of the parties including all Memoranda filed 
relative to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration; and 
(c) All documents not formally filed by the Court or Clerks but 
treated as "lodged" with the Court or Clerk, including memoranda or 
otherwise. 
6. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
7. I certify that: 
(a) A copy of this Nodice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
(b) The Clerk of the District Court has been paid $100.00 in advance 
to be held in trust for the Court Reporter for preparation of the 
transcript pursuant to Rule 24(c), Idaho Appellate Rules; any 
additional will be paid upon determination of the amount required; 
(c) The Clerk of the District Court hasbeen paid $100.00 in advance 
for preparation of the Clerk's Record pursuant to Rule 27(d), Idaho 
Appellate Rules; 
(d) The Appellate Filing Fees of $15.00 to the Clerk of the District 
Court and $86.00 to the Idaho Supreme Court have been tendered with 
this filing; 
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Brown v. City of Pocatello 
(e) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20, Idaho Appellate Rules and upon Stephanie Morse, 
Court Reporter to the Honorable David C. Nye, P.O. Box 4165, 
Pocatello, Idaho, 83205, pursuant to Rule 24(c), Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this 19" day of December, 2008 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 19' day of November 2008 I faxed a copy of the foregoing 
to Blake G. Hall and Sam L. Angel1 of Anderson, Nelson, Hall & Smith, P.A., 490 
Memorial Drive, Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630, Fax 523-7254; and mailed a copy to 
Stephanie Morse, Court Reporter to the Honorable David C. Nye, P.O. Box 4165, 
Pocatello, Idaho, 83205. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
LINDA BROWN, 1 
1 Supreme Court No. 
Plaintiff, 1 
vs. 1 
) CLERKS CERTIFICATE 
1 OF 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a Municipal 1 I 
Corporation; 1 APPEAL 
1 
Defendant, 1 
\ 
Appealed from: Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County 
Honorable David C. Nye, presiding. 
Bannock County Case No: CV-2007-3303-OC 
Order of Judgment Appealed from: ~ecision on Motions for Summary Judgment 
filed the 4~ day of September, 2008; Judgment of Dismissal filed the 1 5 ~  day of 
September, 2008; and Decision on Motion for Reconsideration filed the 7th day of 
November, 2008. 
Attorney for Appellant: Lowell N. Hawkes, Ryan S. Lewis; LOWELL N. HAWKES, 
CHARTERED, Pocatello 
Attorney for Respondent: Blake G. Hall, Sma L. Angell; ANDERSON NELSON 
HALL SMITH, P. A. 
Appealed by: Plaintiff 
Appealed against: Defendant 
Notice of Appeal filed: 12-19-08 
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: No 
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
Request for additional records filed: No 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No 
Name of Reporter: Stephanie Morse 
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
Estimated Number of Pages: 
Dated \ 2- - a a 
(Seal) 
DALE HRTCH, 
Clerk of the D i p W 3 m k ,  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
LINDA BROWN, 1 
1 Supreme Court No. 35992-2009 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
1 
vs. 1 CLERKS CERTIFICATE 
1 
C m  OF POCATELLO, a Municipal 
Corporation; 1 
Defendant-Appellant. 
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that the 
above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound 
under my direction as, and is a true, full, and correct record of the pleadings and 
documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho appellate 
Rules. 
I do further certify that there were no exhibits marked for identification or 
admitted into evidence during the course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this 3 day of 3 , 2009. 
(Seal) 
DALE HATCH 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
LINDA BROWN, 1 
1 Supreme Court No. 35992-2009 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 1 
1 
VS. i CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a Municipal 
j 
1 
Corporation; 1 
1 
~efendant-~ppe~~ant. i 
1 
I, DALE HATCH, the duly elected, qualified and acting Clerk of the District 
Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Bannock, do hereby certify that there were no exhibits marked for identification 
and introduced into evidence at trial. The following exhibit will be treated as a 
exhibit in the above and foregoing cause, to wit: 
1. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment dated 6-9- 
08. 
2. Affidavit of Lindell Turner dated 6-9-08. 
3. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment dtated 7-15-08. 
4. Defendant's Reply Brief dated 7-22-08. 
5. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration dated 10-14-08. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that the above exhibit is attached to, and made a 
part of, the original transcript on appeal in said cause. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of said Court, this the 3 day of 3 , 2009. 
(Seal) 
I N  M E  DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN  AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
LINDA BROWN, 
1 Supreme Court No. 35992-2009 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 1 
) 
vs. j CER~IFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 
1 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a Municipal 
Corporation; 
1 
1 
1 
~efendant -~ppe~~ant .  i 
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that I 
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and CLERKS RECORD to each of the Attorneys of 
Record in this cause as follows: 
LOWELL N. HAWKES BLAKE G. HALL 
RYAN S. LEWIS SAM L. ANGELL 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, Chartered ANDERSON NELSON HALL 
1322 East Center SMITH, P.A. 
P.O. Box 51630 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
I N  WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of said Court at  Pocatello, Idaho, this \ day of- I 09. 
(Seal) 
DALE HATCH, 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bannock County, Idaho Supreme Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
